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Future studies and temperature modelling are innovative tools allowing for the development 
of polar resource management policies and initiatives; however, these tools must be credible, 
relevant, and legitimate to overcome barriers in the science-policy interface. If tools for polar 
resource management are to be credible, relevant and legitimate, then their associated 
uncertainties must be identified, acknowledged and appropriately communicated.  
To date, futures climate modelling for Antarctica has not acknowledged the uncertainties 
present in the Antarctic’s physical and socio-economic elements; nor have scenarios 
acknowledged the social context that influences how futures are interpreted and accepted. 
Climate change is a wicked problem, such that there are many uncertainties involved, the 
risks are high and there is no obvious solution. This dissertation makes the argument that 
post-truth politics within the context of a risk society intensifies existing uncertainties 
involved with climate change and together, provides the framework to undermine Antarctic 
future scenario work and temperature modelling. By acknowledging and referencing 
uncertainties involved with Antarctic climate modelling and future scenario work, the 
credibility, relevance and legitimacy of the science will be increased. 
In an attempt to recognise the diverse range of uncertainties particular to the Antarctic, 
regional physical and socio-economic elements are evaluated and discussed in this 
dissertation. This evaluation is displayed in a dashboard of uncertainties for future 
researchers to utilise, ensuring that Antarctic future scenarios assess and acknowledge 
different outcomes and paths for physical and socio-economic elements. Model uncertainty is 
the most crucial physical uncertainty for Antarctica. It is recommended that policy makers 
acknowledge this uncertainty in order for evidence-based decisions to be made appropriately. 
Additionally, Antarctic governance is particularly important, as it pervades all socio-
economic elements. Researchers should acknowledge the Antarctic Treaty System’s future as 
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Chapter 1: Climate Uncertainty and a Risk Society 
Section 1.1 Introduction 
‘Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified by 
changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended 
period, typically decades or longer’ (IPCC, 2018). Although the climate changes naturally, 
anthropogenic impacts on the environment are forcing the Earth into a state of global 
warming, at a rate greater than previously observed. In this dissertation, the term climate 
change will be referring to climate warming as a result of human forcing. 
 
Climate Change is a wicked problem, as it ‘has innumerable causes, is tough to describe, 
doesn’t have a right answer’; and is a global problem, involving a plethora of organisations, 
governments and individuals1 (Camillus, 2008). Camillus (2008) explains that a wicked 
problem originates when there is a situational change. The wicked problem can involve 
various stakeholders with differing views and opinions on the issue. As more stakeholders are 
involved more challenges are incurred. The way to tackle a wicked problem is through policy 
makers ‘focusing on action’ and ‘picking a starting point’ (Camillus, 2008). 
 
Politically, for many governments, picking a starting point, and focusing on action is to 
declare a climate emergency. One thousand nine hundred and three jurisdictions across the 
globe have declared a climate emergency thus far (Climate Emergency Declaration, 2021). 
New Zealand Climate Change Minister James Shaw described the motion as a ‘clear 
statement of intent to tackle the crisis’ (Morton, 2020). The Minister later explained that 
policy would follow the ‘gesture’ (Morton, 2020) to mitigate emissions to lower the rate of 
warming. The term emergency implies urgency, clearly stating the governments stance 
towards climate change. It places the topic on the agenda, raising public attention and 
awareness of the issue (Willis, 2020). However, it is also a political manoeuvre, where 
governments may be seen as making progress towards solving climate change, even when 
nothing has been achieved.   
 
1 Camillus (2008) collates various papers discussing the definitions and challenges to a wicked problem. Wicked 
does not refer to a degree of difficulty, rather it denotes an issue or problem that is not solvable via traditional 




By declaring a climate emergency, the government has therefore picked a starting point, and 
as Camillus notes the next step is for policy makers to focus on action. One way of doing this 
is future scenario making and temperature modelling. These are tools that allow insight into 
how the globe or region will respond to climate change, again raising public awareness of the 
issue, communicating the issue, and facilitating adaptational policy change (Houghton et al., 
1997).  
 
However, communicating the science is not always simple. There are several boundaries 
across the science policy interface, ‘acting as barriers to communication and collaboration’ 
(Cash et al., 2002). To overcome these barriers, Cash et al. (2002, 2003) propose the CRELE 
framework; whereby information must be credible, relevant and legitimate. The credibility of 
information refers to its trustworthiness; a trait commonly focused upon within climate 
science (Cash et al., 2002). Relevance deals with how commonly connected the topic is to 
policy makers priorities. Legitimacy is how impartial the information is to different 
viewpoints and stakeholders. As previously mentioned, climate models and future scenario 
making can be used as tools, bridging the science policy interface. However, these tools will 
only ever break through this interface’s boundaries if they are proved credible, relevant, and 
legitimate.  
 
Understanding the physical uncertainties helps quantify how reliable climate models are and 
how uncertainties manifest in future Antarctic temperature change predictions. Combining 
physical uncertainties with regional socio-economic uncertainties provides a holistic view of 
regional pressures, thus considering all relevant stakeholders, thereby providing legitimacy to 
climate models and future scenarios. 
 
This dissertation will concentrate on identifying and understanding physical and socio-
economic uncertainties in Antarctica to fill the gap in literature that currently exists in this 
space. Although various Antarctic future scenarios have been constructed (Liggett et al., 
2017; Rintoul et al., 2018), these do not refer to the region’s uncertainties. 
 
By looking at climate change within a societal framework and acknowledging that it is a 
wicked problem, it can be ascertained that physical and socio-economic uncertainties 
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constrain the accuracy of future scenario work and climate modelling. This dissertation will 
answer the question:  
 
How do the physical uncertainties associated with Antarctic climate model projections and 
Antarctic socio-economic uncertainties combine to question the credibility, relevance, and 
legitimacy of Antarctic scenarios? 
 
Beck’s (1992) theory of a risk society explains how modernisation and industrialisation has 
framed how society views and reacts to risk. The notion is that modernization amplifies 
existing insecurities forcing society to view problems with increased scepticism. Post-truth 
politics as an element of modern society further complicates the already complex issue of 
climate change (Beck, 1992). 
 
In this dissertation, climate change will be discussed within the context of a risk society. It 
will show that the social construct of a risk society intensifies uncertainties, leading people to 
question the credibility, relevance and legitimacy of information within the science policy 
interface.  
 
The definition of uncertainties in context with risk will be defined by using existing 
frameworks (O’Neill, 2017; Frame, 2019; Frame 2020) to compile and then analyse a list of 
socio-economic elements particular to the Antarctic. Uncertainties will then be identified 





Antarctica refers to the continent within the Antarctic; any region of land or ocean below 60° South, or the 
Antarctic convergence (National Geographic Society, 2012). This dissertation will be referring to temperature 
projections for the Antarctic, where the appropriate calculations reflect anything below 60° South. 





Section 1.2 Background 
1.2.1 Risk Society 
The social theory of risk society is a significant part of this dissertation. The following 
section provides background on risk society, including aspects of modernity, and its 
relevance to climate change. 
 
Risk is not the detrimental event that will occur as a result of an action, but rather, risk is the 
anticipation of that event (Beck, 2006). As soon as risk becomes real, Beck explains that it 
becomes a catastrophe (Beck, 2006). Without planning and foresight work, risks do not exist. 
It is the visualisation of risks that lead to actions of mediation.  
 
Within his publication, risk society: Towards a New Modernity Beck discusses the shift to 
modernity and with this shift, he describes two phases in which, when dealing with 
unanticipated consequences of technological development, societies evaluate potential risks 
and that, in turn, negatively impacts their perception of scientific and political institutions 
(Beck, 1992; Wimmer & Quandt, 2006). 
 
In acknowledging Beck’s theory, it pays to highlight that critics have communicated issues 
with a ‘risk society’ and its ability to be valid when placed in certain contexts. Ormrod, 
(2013) states that ‘the most discussion has centred on whether Beck’s understanding of risk is 
a realist or constructionist one’ (Ormrod, 2013, p. 728).  Furthermore, Mythen & Walklate 
(2006) build on this statement by explaining that ‘in particular, the conflation of risk and 
uncertainty weakens the purchase of Beck’s thesis, leading him to entertain unrealistic ideas 
about the redistribution of social problems’ (Mythen & Walklate, 2006, p. 393). However, in 
response to these critics, neither discount Beck’s risk society as a valuable concept and 
instead proposes that it is inappropriate for certain contexts. This dissertation supports the 
argument made by Bulkeley, (2001) whereby the context of climate change fits the theory of 
a risk society perfectly. ‘The unbound nature of climate risk has profound implications for 
society, rendering environmental regulation based on national boarders and future 
predictability impotent, and leading to new conflicts which stretch social relations over space 
and time’ (Bulkeley, 2001, p.434). The ideas presented by Beck were released the same year 
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as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. The Chernobyl incident encapsulated Beck’s proposed risk 
society’s notions in an environmental context. 
The risks associated with climate change are so profound they are difficult for some to 
comprehend. The problem is complex and global and may not be solved through 
conventional means, with the consequences almost unrealistic. The view of climate change in 
context with Beck’s theory is thus dystopian ‘in this respect, the risk-society perspective 
serves as both a timely political wake-up call and a harbinger for the future’  (Mythen & 
Walklate, 2006, p. 393). For this reason, criticism of Beck’s risk society being constructionist 
is invalid when viewed with  the dystopian nature of the climate emergency. Therefore, a risk 
society can explain the social response to the risks of climate change, given its unrealistic 
nature. 
 
Climate change fits the exact profile of an unintended consequence of modernity. 
Technological advances in industrialisation, consumerism, and transport, are all human 
developments that have made life more comfortable. However, these developments have had 
unintended consequences that have begun to impact our environment negatively. 
When regarding the catastrophe of global climate change, Beck refers to a significant 
concept; Metamorphosis of the World. This notion describes global change occurring due to 
human actions, with multiple defining features (Beck, 2015). The world is metamorphosing, 
with modernisation occurring due to industrialisation. The ‘goods’ that result from 
modernisation also incur several unintended ‘bads’ (Beck, 2015). In reviewing Beck’s 
theories, Chou confirmed that the effects of climate change are unanticipated (Chou, 2018). 
 
Climate change is complex, involving many uncertainties. Due to the complexity, the theory 
of risk society results in society viewing it as too challenging to solve or some may deny its 





Figure 1 Flow diagram, describing the dynamics of a risk society, with climate change as an example 
 
The unintended ‘bads’ have led to what has been described as the age of side effects where 
the public constantly question authoritative figures or institutions (Beck, 2015). Therefore, 
public mistrust within a risk society is intensified by the uncertainties within climate change 
science and the wide gaps of knowledge in the field. 
 
Mythen (2004) explains that the definition of ‘risk’ has evolved with time. The concepts of 
‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ have primarily been separated, with the outcomes of risk known, 
whilst uncertainty implies unknown consequences. However, in modern-day science, risk 
involves several uncertainties, which creates an issue when quantifying and understanding 
risks. The definitions of risk and uncertainty will be further discussed in the Uncertainty is 
Futures section (1.3.2). 
 
Scientists and other experts use modelling to evaluate global climate change risks. 
Understanding the societal, political, and environmental risks resulting from climate change 
allows for management plans or restoration projects to minimise this risk. Today, it is 
accepted that all risks involve uncertainty and probability; that is, potential dangers or 
hazards that may result in the future. This uncertainty and probability will always be present 
when predicting future changes (Mythen, 2004). It is understandable then that minimising the 




Figure 2 depicts a risk society world, where similar processes to Figure 1 are occurring; 
however, climate science is present, minimising uncertainties, leading to improvements in 
environmental risk management. 
 
 
Figure 2 Flow diagram, describing the dynamics of a risk society, with climate change risks anticipated, as a result of the 
acceptance of climate science 
 
Science must utilise tools, like climate models, to communicate risks to policy advisors and 
facilitate public outreach. However, without quantifying and understanding the uncertainties 
within these climate science tools, the results lack legitimacy. The credibility of results is 
further challenged within a world of post-truth politics. 
 
The post-truth politics world is one where facts have less influence on public opinion due to 
the intervention of personable politicians and selective agendas. Most commonly, Donald 
Trump is a face for post-truth politics, with supporters following and believing his 
statements, even without any factual basis (Spoelstra, 2020). ‘The term ‘post-truth’ suggests 
that the public, or the electorate, shows little interest in ‘the truth’, instead casting their votes 
for the candidate who manages to appeal to their emotions and beliefs’ (Spoelstra, 2020, 
p.757). However, post-truth must be separated from that of lying. Post-truth ‘doesn’t simply 
deny or question certain facts, but it aims to undermine the theoretical infrastructure that 




As a wicked problem in a risk society, climate change already incurs doubt within its factual 
evidence. Society does not trust institutions and questions the credibility of science. 
Furthermore, with post-truth acting to undermine the basis of an issue or subject, any 
uncertainties within the evidence or data to support a theory can potentially be used as 
political tools to manipulate how it will be accepted by society.  
1.2.2 Climate Models 
What are Climate Models 
 
A portion of research on uncertainties in the Antarctic focuses on climate modelling. The 
following section will provide background on and explain how climate models make 
temperature projections. 
 
Climate models are tools to predict changes in the climate system (Gettelman & Rood, 2016). 
Used for public outreach and policy communication, parameters within the climate system 
are forecast on different time and spatial scales. Models can also be used to understand the 
climate system and how it interacts with socio-economic elements. Decision makers and 
policymakers use climate models for insight into potential future risks that may impact the 
globe due to a changing climate. These changes can occur globally and regionally, with 
different climate models forcing predictions accordingly (Gettelman & Rood, 2016). The 
interpretation of a model’s output can communicate urgent changes required to decrease 
anthropogenic emissions (Wilby & Dessai, 2010).  
 
There are many climate models, with a plethora used by the International Panel on Climate 
Changes (IPCC) in their climate Assessment Reports (Houghton et al., 1997; IPCC, 2014, 
2019, 2021). These different models have individual strengths and weaknesses, with some 
models suited to particular tasks more than others. This section discusses climate model’s 
background, detailing the different types of models and their strengths and weaknesses in 
different contexts, with specific mention of climate models used by the IPCC and policy 
communication. 
  
The creation of climate models involves three stages: 
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1.  Physical laws of nature, such as energy and momentum, must be represented as 
mathematical expressions; 
2.  Computers and software express these equations; and 
3.  Models are further built to encapsulate natural processes (Kattsov et al., 2013). 
 
Simple and Complex Models 
There are simple and complex climate models. The equations involved within simulating the 
Earth’s climate can either be minimal or expansive, depending on the level of output 
accuracy and the number of parameters involved within the calculations. A model with a 
small number of equations and variables is termed ‘simple’, whilst a model combining larger 
amounts of Earth system parameters is ‘complex’ (Gettelman & Rood, 2016). Simple climate 
models are computationally cheaper and faster to run, requiring fewer resources. These 
models are suitable for projecting futures involving a singular parameter and often do not 
involve many climate system complexities. Conversely, complex models are usually more 
expensive and take more time and effort to run. Generally, with increasing parameters and 
resolutions, there will be an increase in model complexity (Mcguffie & Henderson-Sellers, 
2014). 
 
Simple and complex models have their advantages and disadvantages; therefore, some 
models are preferred over others depending on the research focus. International climate 
reports utilise both simple and complex models for various reasons and predictions 
(Houghton et al., 1997; IPCC, 2014, 2019, 2021). Projected parameters and regions define 
the type of model being used (Mcguffie & Henderson-sellers, 2014).  
 
The science-policy interface uses models as tools for science communication and policy 
development (Houghton et al., 1997). Public perception significantly alters how decision-
makers receive new scientific information (Lemos & Rood, 2010). Easily interpreted and 
inexpensive, simple models can be a tool to bridge the gap between science and policy, with 
non-climate scientists understanding the outputs (Houghton et al., 1997).    
 
Types of models 
Either complicated or straightforward, climate models are organised into various categories. 
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Energy Balance Models (EBMs) are examples of a simple climate model (Mcguffie & 
Henderson-sellers, 2014; North. R & Kim, 2017). They focus on a single parameter within 
the climate system, and help understand how physical processes in the climate system might 
function.  
 
Earth Models of Intermediate Complexity (EMICs) act as the middle position between simple 
and complex models. These models forecast changes within the climate that involve more 
than one parameter, therefore advancing their level of complexity (Alexeev et al., 2002). The 
predictions made by EMICs are most commonly made for large regions across the globe, 
aiming to detail multiple climate system dynamics (Alexeev et al., 2002). 
 
General Circulation Models (GCMs) are the most complex atmospheric climate models that 
forecast climate change globally. (North. R & Kim, 2017). They involve high levels of 
climate interactions, and represent large numbers of physical processes mathematically, 
inputting as many parameters of the climate system as possible. Due to their complexity, 
GCMs are expensive and time-intensive. They are the climate model most suited to 
forecasting global climate change. (Rummukainen, 2010).  
 
Integrated Assessment Models 
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) combine different climate parameters with different 
parts of the Earth system. They determine how humans interact with the climate and how 
anthropogenic actions may influence it (Gettelman & Rood, 2016). IAM’s model 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels and climatic parameters alongside each 
other. Similar to simple models, IAMs bridge the gap between science and policy. IAMs 
allow the anthropogenic effect on climate to be quantified into something relevant to 




The outputs of multiple climate models can be combined to create Multimodel Ensembles 
(MME) (Samouly et al., 2018). The combination of initial conditions, parameters, and model 
uncertainties produce comprehensive datasets (Tebaldi & Knutti, 2007) that are generally 
more reliable than singular climate models. MMEs also quantify uncertainty in projections 
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rather than just being used in simulations of future climate. Evaluation of MMEs determines 
the GHG emission effects on the climate. Upon analysis, the mean of an MME is the most 
accurate representation of future climate, whilst the MME spread is the uncertainty in that 
prediction (Christiansen, 2020). 
 
International Panel on Climate Change 
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was formed in 1988 by the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) (International Panel on Climate Change, n.d.). Volunteer IPCC scientists and experts 
from institutions worldwide contribute to the research and work done within the reports and 
papers. These are later evaluated by multiple editors and governments, resulting in non-
biased, factual information about climate change (International Panel on Climate Change, 
n.d.). The IPCC collates climate models from various international scientists and groups and 
uses them in their Assessment Reports. The scientific question determines the model used.  
 
Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Modelling 
The Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 3 (CMIP3) was used and evaluated in the 
IPCC’s Assessment Report 4 (AR4), released in 2007 (Kattsov et al., 2013). The IPCC uses 
these evaluations of CMIP3 to compare them with the more developed CMIP5, displaying 
how climate modelling had improved over the seven years before the publication of 
Assessment Report 5 (AR5) in 2014. Assessment Report 6 was due for release in 2021, but 
has been delayed, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with the final synthesis report now due 
for publication in 2022. Whilst the report is yet to be released, a subset of the CMIP6 models 
has been released. This dissertation will subsequently use a portion of this CMIP6 data. 
 
Improvements to a model’s ability to predict future conditions and simulate Earth processes 
are crucial to its reliability. If models forecast highly incorrect projections, then the 
adaptational and mitigation policies will not effectively combat climate change. Similarly, for 





CMIP6 focuses on solving climate projection questions that arose from CMIP5. Given 
CMIP6’s improvements to climate forcing, results would be more accurate and up to date 




Section 1.3 Literature review 
1.3.1 Antarctic Futures 
Future Scenario making is an integral part of policy work. Dependent on the specific research 
aims, different methodology creates a set of futures pertinent to the study’s objective. The 
framework applied to future scenarios’ design can differ, depending on the specified region’s 
environmental, social, and political contexts. The following section aims to review past 
futures work and analyse different methods used, identifying the best framework for creating 
Antarctic futures. This dissertation will identify the most significant socio-economic elements 
contributing to the Antarctic’s future by examining previous literature related to global 
futures, regional futures and Antarctic futures scenario frameworks. Chapter 3 will analyse 
these Antarctic socio-economic elements for their uncertainties.  
 
Scenario Framework 
There are challenges associated with making political and social adaptations to decrease the 
effects of climate change (Ebi, Kram, et al., 2014). To accurately observe how climate affects 
socio-economic parameters, it is essential for policy advice to use climate modelling 
alongside political and social elements in global and regional futures work. 
 
The IPCC created four RCPs in 2014, each projecting a potential pathway for the globe by 
2100 (Moss et al., 2010). Each pathway involves emitted greenhouse gases defined by their 
radiative forcing and trajectory  (Ebi et al., 2014). Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) 
and Shared climate Policy Assumptions (SPAs) are the political and social equivalents to 
‘Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), together combining to create the SSP, SPA 
and RCP scenario matrix’ (Ebi, Kram, et al., 2014; Ebi, Hallegatte, et al., 2014). The matrix 
provides an understanding of how one parameter may affect another. Over time the 
descriptions of SSPs, RCPs and SPAs have changed to result in more accurate futures work 
(O’Neill et al., 2014).  
 
Global Futures 
O’Neill et al. (2017) further develop his original 2014 work by discussing the use of SSPs in 
developing long term global scenarios and their role in climate change analysis. There are 
five SSP scenarios, each with unique conditions, defining differences in societal change 
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(O’Neill et al., 2017). An in-depth summary of each narrative and its associated climate, 
social, and political parameters are summarised in Table 1. SSP scenarios can be flexible, 
with narratives containing global scenario parameters, along with parameters that may differ 
for regional scenarios under the same narrative.  
 
O’Neill et al. (2017) propose a set of socio-economic elements that provide adaptation and 
mitigation challenges (Table 2). These are extremely helpful to researchers, as it allows the 
study into each socio-economic parameter, with analysis on their ability to shape future 
global change. With regional elements commonly being area-specific versions of what is 
occurring globally, O’Neill et al. (2017) global elements provide a benchmark for creating 
lists of socio-economic elements specific to a region.  
 
Regional Futures 
Global futures and policy advice commonly uses the matrix framework. However, there is an 
increasing need for scenario scaling and assessing the SSP’s and evaluating their usage 
within a regional setting for regional futures (Ebi, Hallegatte, et al., 2014).  
 
Beck thought it was clear that geographically, environmental consequences had a flow-on 
effect, where global risks can be felt locally (Mythen, 2004). In the example of climate 
change, the global temperature rise has local risks of rising seas and unpredictable weather 
events. These consequences are heightening humans awareness of the issue and their impact 
on the environment. However, as Frame et al. (2018) notes, local conditions can differ 
significantly from those globally, creating what is described as ‘mini worlds’ (Frame et al., 
2018). Downsizing global conditions to mimic a country or region is a significant and 
potentially incorrect assumption, as local parameters influence a region greatly. 
 
As Antarctic socio, political and environmental parameters differ significantly from the rest 
of the globe, these must be acknowledged when discussing the future of the Antarctic. 
By identifying the conditions that specifically impact regions rather than downscaling global 
conditions, futures scenarios will be more accurate, region-specific and targeted, making 






In 2019, the IPCC published the Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing 
Climate (SROCC) (Pörtner et al., 2019). The report discusses climate projections for the 
ocean and cryosphere, providing outlooks on the Antarctic’s future in a changing climate. As 
stated within the SROCC, ‘The polar regions will be profoundly different in the future 
compared with today, and the degree and nature of that difference will depend strongly on the 
rate and magnitude of global climate change. This will challenge adaptation responses 
regionally and worldwide’ (Pörtner et al., 2019, p.206). The IPCC recognises the Antarctic’s 
future impact, not just environmentally but socially and politically. In direct relevance to 
Antarctic foresight and Antarctic temperature modelling, the IPCC states that tools explicitly 
developed for polar resource management are a successful way to improve a society’s ability 
to combat climate change. Examples of these explicit polar management tools are climate 
models and Antarctic futures scenarios that incorporate explicit regional conditions and 
socio-economic elements. The differences in socio-economic elements between the Antarctic 
and the rest of the globe may result in different outcomes when regionally downscaled. 
Antarctic futures need to ‘capture relevant perspectives and uncertainties’ (O’Neill et al., 
2020, p.1080). Therefore, the Antarctic’s political, social and environmental elements must 
be thoroughly researched and evaluated. The SROCC stresses the need for more work to be 
completed within the Antarctic climate change sector, specifically in areas concerned with 
linking future Antarctic climate with government and society (Pörtner et al., 2019).  
 
This dissertation will support the request by the SROCC to increase research into the 
Antarctic sector by building upon existing futures frameworks and providing insight into the 
uncertainties involved in Antarctic futures work. This acknowledgement of uncertainties 
within foresight work ensures more credible, relevant and legitimate Antarctic futures. The 
work will act as a tool for researchers, governments and institutions, increasing their ability to 
plan and create legislation that can minimise regional and global emission levels. 
 
Existing Antarctic futures each have their strengths and weaknesses. Rintoul et al. (2018) 
present two potential future scenarios for the Antarctic, set in 2070. The first scenario 
illustrates unregulated emission levels and an ineffective policy environment. In the second 
future, policy decisions vastly decrease emission levels. The climactic futures were coupled 
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with past societal trends, developing two future Antarctic outcomes that consisted of a 
mixture of both the societal and climate aspects of narrative making. 
 
Coupling socio-economic trends with Antarctic climate patterns develops Antarctic futures 
that are cross-disciplinary. Rintoul et al. (2018) demonstrate that the Antarctic’s future will 
be negatively impacted unless political action is taken to reduce emission levels.  
However, by assuming the Antarctic’s future could go one of two ways, Rintoul et al. (2018) 
ignore the uncertainties within socio-economic and climatic parameters, resulting in the two 
future scenarios not being credible. 
 
Rintoul et al. (2018) displayed how inaction leads to Antarctic destruction; however, did not 
provide breakthrough scientific discoveries or results. The two futures acted more as public 
outreach rather than providing new information.  
 
Liggett et al. (2017) analyse the major parameters driving future change in the Antarctic and 
provide an alternative view of the continent’s future. By analysing Antarctic challenges and 
meticulously evaluating socio-economic elements, Liggett et al. provide credibility, relevance 
and legitimacy to their futures. 
 
Based on previous literature, Liggett et al. (2017) state that the parameters most likely to 
impact the future of the Antarctic are: 
 
‘global environmental and socio-economic developments; Antarctic governance; Antarctic 
research, including national Antarctic programme operations; and Antarctic tourism’ 
(Liggett et al., 2017, p.459). 
 
Liggett et al. (2017) explained that the four Antarctic future scenarios created were to 
‘stimulate further discussion, rather than provide predictions’ (Liggett et al., 2017, p.474). 
This point is similar to Rintoul et al. (2018); however, the creation of the four futures by 
Liggett et al. (2017) provides a comprehensive overview of a range of potential scenarios 
rather than the creation of just two unrealistic futures. There is a need for more advanced and 
insightful tools, such as future scenario work, to aid in Antarctic adaptational planning 
(Pörtner et al., 2019).  
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Frame (2019) provides a structure for researches creating Antarctic futures, aligning 
Antarctic futures ‘within the broader scope of future studies’ (Frame, 2019, p.236).  
The framework devised by Frame splits future studies into three categories: Extrapolatory, 
Back-Casting and Exploratory.  
 
Extrapolatory futures use current trends and physical data to extrapolate future scenarios.  
Back-Casting involves viewing the future as ‘utopian’ or ‘dystopian’ and creates worst and 
best-case scenarios. An example of Back-Casting is the two Antarctic futures by Rintoul et al. 
(2018). Exploratory studies combine both the Extrapolatory and Back-Casting 
methodologies, using trends to create realistic futures. However, Exploratory studies employ 
decision making to infer whether a future may deviate from current trends. These futures 
involve a variety of stakeholders, all with different and sometimes opposing views.  
 
The most complex and cross-disciplinary futures making method is Integral Futures which 
involves critical theory and cultural studies. Integral future making moves beyond using 
traditional tools of examining trends and works to understand the cultural and societal 
complexities that may lead to uncertain and volatile futures (Frame, 2019).  
 
Frame (2020) builds upon previous work (Frame, 2019), by highlighting the importance 
socio-economic elements have on the Antarctic’s future. There are complexities involved 
within the interactions of the Antarctic’s climate, society and politics, and information 
between these parameters must be communicated for results to be policy-relevant (Frame, 
2020b). 
 
Future scenarios need to ‘improve applicability to regional and local scales’ (O’Neill et al., 
2020, p.1079). The political system in the Antarctic is precarious as it does not involve a 
single government but relies on treaties and consensus. Furthermore, the Antarctic is 
subsequently unique with its processes of environmental protection. Therefore, new Antarctic 
future scenarios need to analyse how political changes or uncertainty may impact the 
Antarctic’s future (Frame, 2020).  
 
Furthermore, ‘a continuous re-evaluation of the current range of uncertainties in SSPs, RCPs 
and their combinations’ is required when making global or regional futures (O’Neill et al., 
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2020, p.1080). Analysing Uncertainties within the modelling, climate, social, political, and 
economic spheres provides for the diversity and different perspectives O’Neill et al. calls for.  
(O’Neill et al., 2020).  
 
An Antarctic integrated futures proposal, suggested by Frame (2020), builds upon research by 
O’Neill et al. (2014, 2017), resulting in a framework for future studies centred around the 
Antarctic continent.  
 
As previously discussed within this section, O’Neill et al. (2017) created a list of critical 
elements contributing to the globe’s political, environmental and social future. These 
parameters were listed as nine categories with 24 physical, social and geopolitical elements 
(Table 2). O’Neill et al. (2017) compiled the elements, proposing that they act as the basis for 
global climate scenarios.  
Within his research note Towards an Antarctic scenarios dashboard Frame (2020a) builds on 
his previous work (Frame, 2020), providing a comprehensive dashboard of 7 categories, with 
17 associated elements, all specifically impacting future Antarctic Scenarios (derived from 
O’Neill et al. (2017) set of global scenario elements). Each element has indicators that act as 
‘quantifiable, outcome-based statements to measure the extent to which goals or objectives 
are met’ (Frame, 2020a, p.462). 
 
The seven categories that Frame (2020a) derived from O’Neill et al. (2017) are as follows: 
 
Direct Human Impact; Economic Impact; Ecological and Environmental Processes; 
Resources exploitation; Institutions and Governance; Technological Development; and  
Broader societal factors. 
 
These seven categories reflect specific human activities in the Antarctic. Frame (2020a) 
explains that the categories include various relevant topics, merging the interests of 
individuals with significance to the Antarctic’s future. A more detailed copy of Frames 
(2020a) elements and indicators is attached as a dashboard (Table 3). Using this dashboard of 
elements allows researchers to create future Antarctic scenarios with an integrated approach 
allowing  societal, political and environmental factors to work cohesively together, with the 
RCPs, SSPs and SPAs all combining to create sets of scenarios. (Frame, 2020a). 
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O’Neill et al. (2020) explain that by increasing the inclusiveness of scenarios, futures are 
more applicable to groups and individuals from different organisations and sectors, increasing 
their relevance to different ‘communities and cultures’ (O’Neill et al., 2020, p.1080). 
Literature acknowledges that foresight work and temperature modelling are tools that work 
closely together to predict environmental risk. No Antarctic futures work to date has used the 
approach that integrates climate modelling with social and political factors, as Frame 
suggests (2020).  
 
This dissertation will identify the uncertainties within the Antarctic socio-economic space, so 
new future scenarios can be made that acknowledge and explore these uncertainties and how 
they may affect the future of the continent.  
1.3.2 Uncertainty in Futures 
Predicting the future, globally or regionally, involves high levels of uncertainties. 
Uncertainties can be in the empirical modelling portion of a region and within the system’s 
socio-economic elements. Combining physical uncertainties with Antarctic socio-economic 
uncertainties result in more credible, relevant, or legitimate tools for polar resource 
management.  
The following section will highlight the different sources of physical and socio-economic  
uncertainties in an Antarctic context. Various definitions for uncertainties will be discussed in 
context with risk, as uncertainties can have different meanings depending on their context.  
 
Model Uncertainties 
Uncertainties within climate model predictions arise from three different sources: 
Model Uncertainty, Scenario Uncertainty, and Natural Climate Variability.  
 
Uncertainties constrain climate models’ reliability. These uncertainties are essential within 
the climate science sphere and are important when dealing with the science-policy interface. 
Uncertainty within climate models reduces the accuracy of the output itself and decreases the 
public’s ability to understand and receive the message being forecast (Lemos & Rood, 2010). 
Decreasing the sources of uncertainty within climate models would increase their accuracy, 
resulting in more reliable information for future scenarios. There will never be ‘perfect’ 
models, with unknowns always present within the climate system (Lemos & Rood, 2010). 
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However, the more sources of uncertainty that can be minimised and acknowledged within 
climate models, the more credible, reliable and legitimate climate modelling will be.  
The three types of climate model uncertainties come from computational errors, unknowns 
within the Earth system and their processes, and uncertainties involved when predicting 
future scenarios; these will be described in the following paragraphs and will later be 
referenced in Chapter 2. 
 
The climate system has a certain amount of Internal Variability (also known as Natural 
Variability) associated with any projections. Climate model predictions are forced in a 
chaotic system, where the natural variability is a given. Hawkins and Sutton (2009) explain 
natural variability as fluctuations that occur in response to an absence of radiative forcing at a 
given time. Natural climate variability can disguise or intensify anthropogenic changes in the 
climate and potentially reverse the long-term trends of human-forced climate change. 
Therefore, those tasked with making decisions around adapting to a warming world need to 
recognise and understand these fluctuations (Hawkins & Sutton, 2011). 
 
Model Uncertainty relates to any unknowns associated with the model itself. Depending on 
the model’s structure, a specific radiative forcing response will be different (Hawkins & 
Sutton, 2009). Model uncertainty can also be due to the poor representations of earth system 
processes and their uncertainties in their paramatisation.  
 
Scenario Uncertainty is the final type of uncertainty associated with modelling future 
projections. The model outputs rely heavily on its inputs. Depending on how these inputs 
change, the overall result will differ. A future projection will never be entirely accurate, with 
the scenario chosen to input into a climate model will always have uncertainties associated 
with it (Hawkins & Sutton, 2009). 
 
The three sources of uncertainty mentioned above take on different levels of importance over 
different timescales and different regions (Hawkins and Sutton, 2009). The Antarctic will 
have different types and levels of uncertainty due to specific climatic processes active in the 





Quantifying Uncertainties in Models 
When Hawkins and Sutton plotted the three sources of uncertainty using CMIP3 data for the 
globe, they found that the three sources of uncertainty took precedence depending on the lead 
time and the prediction’s regional scale (Hawkins and Sutton 2009). In either shorter, or 
longer projection times (decadal or multi-decadal), model uncertainty is dominant. However, 
internal variability plays a vital role in shorter projection times and smaller spatial scales. 
Scenario uncertainty is more important on larger time scales (Hawkins & Sutton, 2009). 
 
Although Hawkins & Sutton (2009) modelling was completed using CMIP3 data, the paper’s 
ideas remain applicable to modern-day climate projections. 
 
As observed in Figure 3, Hawkins and Sutton (2009) modelled the fractional uncertainty at 
global and regional scales, determining what sources of uncertainty took precedence at 
particular times. Depending on the region projected, there were differences in uncertainty and 
what source of uncertainty dominated. Fractional uncertainty projections are beneficial for 
adaptational policymaking. Futures makers can evaluate these uncertainties to make 
legitimate future scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 3 Fractional Uncertainty for Model Uncertainty, Scenario Uncertainty and Internal Variability for the Globe and the 
British Isles using CMIP3. Copied from Hawkins and Sutton (2009) 
Figure 3 from Hawkins and Sutton (2009) shows the three sources of fractional uncertainty 
for both the globe and the British Isles. The significant observed differences between the 
fractional uncertainty for the globe and the British Isles are that the model and scenario 
uncertainty remain the most dominant uncertainty forces. However, as previously mentioned, 
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natural variability is more important throughout the entire projection for the British Isles and 
most important during the first 60 years of projections.  
The importance of internal variability of the climate is far smaller in the projection for the 
globe, comparatively—the total overall uncertainty between projections increases on the 
smaller spatial scale. Model uncertainty is more significant within the smaller spatial scale, 
whilst scenario uncertainty remains reasonably similar.   
 
Importance of Narrowing Model Uncertainties 
Wilby and Dessai (2010) pose the question:  
 
How can environmental adaptation’s societal benefits be recognised if all models predicting 
change include uncertainties? 
Uncertainties within climate models will affect the outcome of any given parameter chosen 
and will be intensified if used in conjunction with socio-economic and political models in 
IAMs (Schneider & Mastrandrea, 2009). Hawkins and Sutton (2009, 2011) effectively 
address the ability to minimise climate model uncertainties explaining that model uncertainty 
can be minimized. Internal variability is a measurement of the natural variability and 
therefore is not reducible. It is challenging to minimise scenario uncertainty (Hawkins and 
Sutton, 2009). 
To further analyse uncertainty on a regional scale, Hawkins and Sutton (2009) modelled the 
continental signal to noise (S/N) ratios. The S/N is 
attached as Figure 4—the more considerable the 
S/N, the smaller the fractional uncertainty. 
Hawkins and Sutton (2009) explain the high 
uncertainty involved with high latitude climate 
feedbacks, resulting in Greenland exhibiting a 
much lower S/N ratio than the globe.  
The low S/N for Greenland is representative of 
high amounts of fractional uncertainty.  
Because it is a polar region, it is likely to exhibit 
higher than average model uncertainty and natural 
Figure 4 Signal to noise ratio of surface air 
temperatures at different regions, copied from 
Hawkins and Sutton (2009) 
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variability due to poor representations of climate processes and unique climate feedbacks 
systems. 
Hawkins and Sutton (2009) argue that model uncertainty has clear maximums in high 
latitudes, which could be explained by the uncertainty involved with projecting the climate 
feedback loops within these regions. In longer decadal periods, model uncertainty accounts 
for the most significant fraction of variance. From Hawkins and Sutton (2009), a global map 
of the sources of uncertainty at different latitudes is attached as Figure 5.  
Hawkins and Sutton (2009) state that the most important source of uncertainty over the next 
decade or so in climate projections is model uncertainty. This is especially true in polar 
regions as there are unique climate processes that may not be represented correctly. 
Furthermore, model uncertainty is the most important source of uncertainty for polar regions 
as it can be minimised. 
In accordance with the conclusions reached by Hawkins and Sutton, that recommend using 
model variety to recognize different sources of uncertainty, this dissertation will use a variety 
Figure 5 Visual representation of the importance of different sources of uncertainties at different time scales and 
latitudes, copied from Hawkins and Sutton (2009) 
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of models when forecasting future temperature change uncertainties for the globe and the 
Antarctic, keeping an appropriate sample size (Hawkins and Sutton, 2011). 
 
CMIP5 Model Uncertainty 
Mauritzen et al. (2017) add to Hawkins and Sutton (2009; 2011) by exploring uncertainty in 
CMIP5, concluding that model uncertainty within climate models is due to climate 
sensitivity, much like the conclusions of Hawkins and Sutton (2009). 
Mauritzen et al. (2017) found that as time increases, so does the model uncertainty. By 
minimising model uncertainty, climate models can improve future scenarios’ reliability, 
credibility, and legitimacy (Mauritzen et al., 2017). 
 
Mauritzen et al., (2017) found that the only areas that maintained a high level of model 
uncertainty across all periods were the Arctic and the Southern Ocean regions; this would 
imply that when projecting future temperature uncertainties for CMIP6, the Antarctic will 
have a similarly higher model uncertainty. This is crucial information for policy makers, as it 
indicates a large range of future Antarctic surface air temperatures. This highlights low 
confidence in the modelling results, with model uncertainty needing to be acknowledged, so 
that the science is not questioned. 
 
Social Uncertainty and Risk 
Uncertainty can have different meanings depending on its context. Subsequently, there are 
multiple definitions of uncertainty. The following will explore the core definitions of 
uncertainty within social and environmental circles and how they relate and differ from 
definitions of risk.  
 
Defining Risk and Uncertainty 
There are many definitions of uncertainty within the sciences, social sciences, and political 
spheres (Shackley & Wynne., 1996). Sources of uncertainty can build upon one another, 
contributing to a higher sense of an individual’s uncertainty regarding a situation 
(FeldmanHall & Shenhav, 2019).  
 
Risk is when the outcomes are more or less known and anticipated by decision-makers or 
adaptational policymakers. However, when discussing uncertainty, the situation involves 
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various parameters or outcomes that are unclear and unknown (Funtowicz & Ravetz., 1990; 
Wynne., 1992). Wynne (1992) elaborates that uncertainty is the unknowns associated with 
environmental risks due to ‘lack of scientific knowledge’ (Wynne, 1992, p.118). To elaborate 
further, FeldmanHall & Shenhav (2019) define uncertainty as the precision of a prediction 
based on previous information. How uncertain a situation or prediction is, depends on how 
many uncertainties are constrained within the situation or science. The uncertainty of 
Antarctic’s future climate increases as the uncertainties in the modelling and socio-economic 
elements increase. If these uncertainties within the futures work are decreased, then the 
overall uncertainty in the Antarctic’s future will decrease.   
 
However, there will always be uncertainties involved within scientific experiments, 
modelling or testing (Funtowicz & Ravetz., 1990; Wynne., 1992). These uncertainties are 
similarly present in socio-economic elements, as there will always be aspects of the social 
world out of the control of researchers. 
 
Epistemological uncertainty is where unknowns are within the bounds of knowledge 
(Derbyshire, 2020). Ontological uncertainty is the future unknowns that come as complete 
surprises (Derbyshire, 2020). Reducing model uncertainties will only reduce epistemological 
uncertainty; however, modelling does not help understand or predict ontological uncertainty 
(Derbyshire, 2020). For this reason, to reduce uncertainty within Antarctic futures, a cross-
disciplinary approach must be made, where modelling is combined with socio-economic 
aspects. 
 
An example of ontological uncertainty is the occurrence of COVID-19. Highlighted further in 
Chapter 3, coronavirus is predicted to affect the globe and the Antarctic significantly. 
COVID-19 was a surprise, a form of uncertainty unpredicted by futures makers. For this 
reason, this dissertation will not privilege model uncertainty but rather describe and evaluate 
uncertainties within both the modelling and socio-economic space for the Antarctic.  
 
Policy and Communicating Uncertainties  
Science can uncover knowledge that eliminates uncertainties; however, it can also mask other 
uncertainties (Wynne, 1992). Funtowicz & Ravetz (1990) argue that individuals who use 
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quantitative data within the policy sphere will run into issues, with policymakers taking 
numbers or scientific advice for a fact, without context.  
 
There are commonly little to no public policy outcomes for science-led projects and issues 
(Meah, 2019). It is not the specific uncertainties within science that discourage public policy 
decisions, as it is common for politics to contain uncertainties of their own. The difference in 
the science-policy interface is that scientists act as advisors to government officials on 
climate issues, often not placing the science in other contexts, such as the political viability of 
the advice; therefore, they end up acting as the boundary between public policy and science 
(Meah, 2019). Climate science must run parallel with public policy processes for science 
advice to work. Science and future projection work needs to acknowledge, understand and 
appropriately communicate uncertainties to policymakers. Policy advisors want a 
straightforward answer, even when the climate system is complex, with many uncertainties. It 
is incorrect to expect a singular number, or a temperature prediction, to be an exact 
representation of a future world.  
 
As previously discussed, a risk society advances technologically, with previous risk 
assessment models becoming outdated with modernity. The side-effects of pollution grow to 
a level uncontrollable and challenging to manage and reduce. Chou (2018) believes that 
climate change is less an environmental problem than a political issue, where risk prevention 
and industrialisation policies are essential. The lines between politics and science are 
becoming blurred, with both spheres synonymous when regarding climate change.  
 
Within a risk society, institutions are not always equipped to manage risks, resulting in 
political concerns associated with the distribution of ‘bads’ rather than ‘goods’ (Bulkeley, 
2001). Institutions within a risk society begin to breakdown, as society starts to pin 
accountability to organisations due to lack of cohesiveness surrounding risk management 
discussions.  
 
If climate change policies and actions are to be effective, action from all tiers of private and 
political institutions is crucial (Bulkeley, 2001). Furthermore, minimising uncertainties across 
all elements within a region is critical for effective climate change policies and adaptations 
(Wynne, 1992; Bulkeley, 2001). Improving model predictions is not good enough. This 
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practice of refining climate science tools must combine with analysing ‘social commitments 
that build over the existing knowledge because it is here that ignorance and its corresponding 
risks are created’ (Wynne, 1992, p.115). Modelling and foresight work are two tools that help 
inform risk management teams and policy advisors. To ensure that Antarctic future scenario 
work is communicated effectively as informed policy advice, both the scientific and socio-
economic uncertainties in the Antarctic must be identified and acknowledged.  
1.3.3 DAPPs 
Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways (DAPPs) is a policy and decision-making method within 
areas of significant uncertainties (Cradock-Henry et al., 2018; Haasnoot et al., 2013). The 
framework combines Adaptive Policymaking and Adaption Pathways. DAPPs involve steps, 
ensuring that uncertainties involved within policymaking are analysed and evaluated to 
ensure credible and relevant policy advice. The processes involved within the DAPP 
framework are copied from Derbyshire (2020) and are attached as Figure 6. 
 
The DAPP system is a framework that minimises uncertainties within a policy environment. 
The DAPP process does not limit policy makers to choosing one future, rather, a range of 
potential options can be explored, allowing for more relevant adaptational policy making 
(Cradock-Henry et al., 2018). The work completed in this dissertation will serve as the early 
stages in the DAPP process (1 and 2 from Figure 6), so future work can be completed using 
the results, to inform polar policy advice.  
 
 
Figure 6 Processes Involved within DAPP, sourced from Derbyshire (2020) 
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Section 1.4 Research Aims 
Polar models and futures studies are tools within the policy science interface, used for 
communication and political advice (Houghton et al., 1997).  
Whilst Global uncertainties affect future scenarios, it is imperative that regional 
characteristics, including uncertainties, are analysed for credible, relevant and legitimate 
future scenarios that can aid in policy advice and development. In clearly analysing, 
quantifying and communicating uncertainties and risks within future scenarios, results will be 
more reliable and better understood. 
 
With a focus on regional uncertainties applicable to the Antarctic, this dissertation aims to 
answer the following research question; 
 
How do the physical uncertainties associated with Antarctic climate model projections and 
Antarctic socio-economic uncertainties combine to question the credibility, relevance, and 
legitimacy of Antarctic scenarios? 
 
Understanding the model uncertainties helps quantify how reliable climate models are and 
how uncertainties manifest in future Antarctic temperature change predictions. Combining 
physical uncertainties with Antarctic socio-economic uncertainties results in a greater 
understanding of why future some Antarctic scenarios may not be credible, relevant, or 
legitimate.  
 
As a conclusion of this dissertation, findings can be used for political advice, indicating ways 
to minimise uncertainties within the Antarctic modelling and socio-economic space.  
 
For the aim of this dissertation to be met, three objectives will be completed.  
 
1. To complete a sensitivity study, quantifying the sources of uncertainty associated 
with predictions for future global temperature, and future Antarctic temperature. 
 
Hawkins and Sutton (2009; 2011) used the CMIP3 from AR4 to assess the limitations and 
unknowns within global and regional climate modelling. CMIP5 was released in 2014, with 
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CMIP6 due to be released in the AR6. The advancements made to these models can change 
the accuracy and minimise particular uncertainties within predictions.  
The sensitivity study completed will use the models within CMIP6 to provide a more up-to-
date analysis of global predictions. Furthermore, Antarctic temperature uncertainties will be 
projected for the first time. The modelling completed within this dissertation will be a new 
addition to work within the uncertainties in temperature predictions. The most crucial 
physical uncertainty for Antarctica, within temperature projections, will then be identified. 
 
2. Uncertainties within Antarctic socio-economic elements will be determined and 
acknowledged. The largest source of uncertainty within the Antarctic socio-
economic elements will then be identified. 
The Antarctic socio-economic dashboard of elements proposed by Frame (2020a) will be 
used as the backbone for this research. A subset of Frame (2020a) elements will comprise a 
new dashboard, indicating the most important socio-economic elements to the Antarctic’s 
future. Upon further research into these socio-economic elements, the associated uncertainties 
will additionally be included in the dashboard. By identifying what socio-economic element 
contains the most significant uncertainty, future scenario work can accommodate a range of 
possibilities, outlining how that element may change or develop with time. Subsequently, 
future scenarios would be more robust to the main uncertainties within Antarctic socio-
economic elements. 
 
3. The discussion of a risk society in relevance to Antarctic futures and climate 
change will place the findings of this dissertation in context.  
Possible ways that a risk society and post-truth politics can magnify uncertainties within 
climate change will be discussed, and how this has relevance for Antarctic temperature 
modelling and future scenario making. 
 
Hypothesis 
Based on previous research (Hawkins and Sutton 2009; 2011), various hypotheses have been 
formulated on the modelling experiments completed within this dissertation. 
 
When regarding the predictions for the uncertainties associated with future temperature 
projections, the hypothesis is that the results will show a significant difference between the 
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three sources of uncertainty for the globe versus the values of the three sources of uncertainty 
for the Antarctic. 
 
It is hypothesised that internal variability will be higher for the Antarctic than the globe and 
scenario uncertainty will be relatively similar for the globe and the Antarctic.  
Finally, the model uncertainty for Antarctic future temperature projections, especially at 





Chapter 2: Global and Antarctic Temperature Model Uncertainties 
Section 2.1 Modelling Temperature Uncertainties  
2.1.1 Global Temperature Model Uncertainties 
The CMIP6 (Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 6) data uses 44 different climate 
models. Here, a subset of 19 models, have been used to project three different uncertainty 
sources and their amounts, for global, Antarctic and Arctic surface temperatures. Projections 
for the Arctic will act as a reference point for the Antarctic results. Table 4 in Appendix 1 
lists the 19 models, and associated references, used in this work. 
 
Hawkins and Sutton define the mathematics behind internal variability, model uncertainty 
and scenario uncertainty.  
 






‘Where var𝑠,𝑡 , denotes the variance across scenarios and time, and V is constant in time’ 
(Hawkins and Sutton (2009), p.1103). 
 










where var𝑤 is the variance, weighted, on the different models and ‘𝑁𝑠 is the number of 
scenarios’ (Hawkins and Sutton (2009), p.1103). 
 








𝑆(𝑡) is scenario uncertainty and changes with time.  
 
The mathematics for internal variability, scenario uncertainty and model uncertainty 
described by Hawkins and Sutton (2009) was used as a starting point for the modelling 
completed in this dissertation. It should be noted that Hawkins and Sutton (2009) weighted 
CMIP3 models when determining the amounts and sources of uncertainty. This is where 
particular models, that are known to perform extremely well when representing certain 
processes, are given a larger weight over lesser performing models. This has been proven, in 
some cases, to decrease model uncertainty (Lorenz et al., 2018). However, for regions like 
Antarctica, where observational datasets are smaller, and there is greater internal variability, 
weighting particular models can create a greater uncertainty in the results  (Weigel et al., 
2010, p. 4175). There was no weighting of models in this dissertation, and thus the results 
represent a more simplified version of the modelling completed by Hawkins and Sutton 
(2009). 
 
Only one time-series realisation from each of the models was used to determine the three 
sources of uncertainty for the 19 models in the dataset (Table 4). A polynomial fit was 
applied to each time series to ‘provide the best approximation of the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variable’ (Ayush, 2019). By using a polynomial fit, a wide range 
of patterns could be applied, which is required when determining the amounts and sources of 
uncertainty. Four RCP and SSP combinations were used in this dataset. Namely SSP126 
(SSP1-RCP2.6), SSP245 (SSP2-RCP4.5), SSP370 (SSP3-RCP7.0) and SSP585 (SSP5-
RCP8.5). This allowed for a range of outcomes to be assessed for their uncertainties, rather 
than calculating uncertainties for only one type of SSP or RCP. 
 
The natural variability (internal variability) was derived by calculating the variance between 
the historical polynomial fit and the time series. This was further calculated for each of the 




The model uncertainty involved creating a two-dimensional array, with the polynomial fits of 
each model and model simulations as a function of time. Following this, variances of all 
polynomial fits and future scenarios were calculated, then averaged. The averages of all 
variances represented the model uncertainty, changing with time. 
 
The scenario uncertainty follows a similar method to the model uncertainty. Both the 
polynomial fits of each model and model simulations as a function of time were input into a 
two-dimensional matrix. The mean was calculated for each future scenario, the variance on 
each average, corresponding with an associated time, resulted in the scenario uncertainty. 
2.1.2 Antarctic Temperature Model Uncertainties 
Derivation of the Antarctic Temperature Model Uncertainties utilised the same process used 
to simulate the Global Temperature Model uncertainties. However, to simulate the Antarctic 
projection, only regions poleward of  60° South were used in the analysis.  
 
The model MCM-UC-1-0 did not contain data for South of 60°, resulting in its exclusion 
from the simulation. Subsequently, 19 CMIP6 models projected global uncertainties, and 18 
CMIP6 models were used to simulate Antarctic uncertainties.  
Arctic uncertainties were projected, following the same process as the Antarctic uncertainties; 
however, the region defined is situated over the North pole. The Arctic uncertainties were 
projected to act as a comparator for the Antarctic uncertainties.  
Section 2.2 Temperature Uncertainty Projections 
2.2.1 Temperature Model Uncertainties Results 
Below are the projected model uncertainty results, internal variability, and scenario 
uncertainty for the globe, Arctic and Antarctic. The interpretation of these results can be 
found in the section Temperature Model Uncertainties Discussion. 
 
Within simulations for the globe, displayed in Figure 7, Natural Variability is approximately 
0.1°C2. The Scenario Uncertainty for the globe displays an exponential pattern, with a 
maximum of 1.6°C2 at 2100, intersecting with model uncertainty in 2070. Model Uncertainty 
for the globe exhibited a reasonably linear pattern, reaching 0.75°C2 in 2100. Figure 8 
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displays the patterns for Arctic simulations. Natural Variability is approximately 0.25°C2 and 
is more significant than that observed globally in Figure 7. Scenario Uncertainty for the 
Arctic again follows an exponential pattern with a maximum of 5.75°C2 in 2100. In 2050, 
natural variability and scenario uncertainty intersect. Arctic model uncertainty begins at 
approximately 0.5, then follows a steep, relatively linear, incline reaching a maximum value 
of 7.6 in 2100. Interestingly the model uncertainty is considerably more significant than the 
scenario uncertainty in this region. Thus, improvements in climate model performance will 
likely significantly impact the reduction of uncertainties in this region. 
 
Figure 9 shows the Antarctic temperature uncertainty projections. The Antarctic Natural 
Variability is 0.15°C2 whilst the Scenario Uncertainty for the Antarctic is exponential, with a 
maximum of 1.6°C2 in 2100. Antarctic Model Uncertainty begins at 0.15°C2 and then follows 
a steep exponential incline, reaching a maximum of 2.1°C2 in 2100. 
 
Figure 9 Global Uncertainty for Future Temperature 
Projections using CMIP6 
Figure 9 Arctic Uncertainty for Future Temperature 
Projections using CMIP6 
Figure 9 Antarctic Uncertainty for Future Temperature 
Projections using CMIP6 
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Both the Arctic and the Antarctic projections display more considerable model uncertainty 
than the globe. More significant model uncertainty over the poles is expected, as 
representations of climate interactions and processes over the polar regions can be poor in 
climate modelling. This will be discussed further in the next section; 2.2.2. The Arctic model 
uncertainty is more significant than the Antarctic and the Global projections values of this 
uncertainty. Natural variability is similar in both the Arctic and the Antarctic but more 
considerable than in the globe projections. As will be discussed further in section 2.2.2, 
natural variability is greater for polar regions due to polar amplification. Scenario uncertainty 
displays the same pattern across all three graphs, with the Antarctic and the Global 
projections maintaining similar levels, whilst the Arctic has higher levels of scenario 
uncertainty. The values for scenario uncertainty and model uncertainty are more significant 
for the Arctic than the Antarctic and the globe, with Arctic values of scenario uncertainty, 
natural variability, and model uncertainty being the greatest of all three simulations. As will 
be discussed in 2.2.2, differences in uncertainty levels for the polar regions must be 
acknowledged, and communicated across the science-policy interface. For justified evidence-
based policy decisions to be made, there must be an understanding of these uncertainties to 
ensure mitigation and adaptational changes are relevant to both the Arctic and the Antarctic 
specifically. 
2.2.2 Temperature Model Uncertainties Discussion 
Scenario Uncertainty 
Model outputs rely heavily on their inputs. Depending on how these inputs change, the 
overall result will differ. Scenario uncertainty identifies the results of potential choices, with 
the scenario chosen to input into a climate model always having uncertainties associated with 
it (Hawkins & Sutton, 2009).  
Scenario uncertainty, explained by Hawkins and Sutton (2009), is clearer over longer 
periods. (Hawkins & Sutton, 2009). CMIP6 modelling confirmed this, with scenario 
uncertainty presenting an exponential increase for the globe, the Antarctic and the Arctic.  
 
Minimising Scenario Uncertainty 
Minimising scenario uncertainty is difficult (Hawkins and Sutton, 2009), as there will always 
be uncertainties associated with choosing future conditions as inputs for climate models. This 
difficulty is presented in Figures 7, 8 and 9, where the scenario uncertainty increases with 
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time. As previously explained in Chapter 1, socio-economic elements make up SSP 
narratives. SSP scenarios comprise the socio-political-economic portion of climate 
modelling, determining potential future climates. By evaluating socio-economic 
uncertainties, inputs into a climate model could be altered depending on what avenues of 
future societal change need to be explored. Based on their uncertainties, altering social inputs 
to a climate model could help to create more informed SSP decisions, therefore minimising 
scenario uncertainty. An example of this would be to create socio-economic inputs that 
explore the future of Antarctic governance and how different avenues of its future may affect 
other socio-economic elements, and how its different pathways may affect emission levels. 
This may decrease the amount of scenario uncertainty present in Antarctic climate models.  
 
Model Uncertainty 
Model Uncertainty cannot be derived from a single model, but the spread of model results for 
the same scenario after considering internal variability can be used to derive an estimate. 
Depending on the model’s structure, a specific radiative forcing response will be different 
(Hawkins & Sutton, 2009). 
 
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show that model uncertainty is present in projections for the globe, 
Antarctica and the Arctic. However, the model uncertainty is the most important source of 
uncertainty in the Arctic and Antarctica, with it displaying the highest levels of variance 
across all time scales. Higher model uncertainty in the Arctic is conclusive with the findings 
by Hawkins and Sutton (2009), where projections of uncertainty for Greenland had a lower 
S/N ratio than the rest of the globe. Greenland’s low S/N was due to higher natural variability 
and model uncertainty over the poles due to poor representations of climate processes and 
unique climate feedback systems present over the Arctic region. Mauritzen et al. (2017) 
support this finding, with their results concluding that model uncertainty for CMIP5 models 
increased over time and was present in more significant amounts for regions situated over the 
Arctic and the Southern Ocean.  
 
Minimising Model Uncertainty 
Significant values in the model uncertainty for the poles are due to uncertainty in projecting 
the climate feedback loops within these regions (Hawkins and Sutton, 2009). Watson (2008) 
agrees that it is this presence of climate feedback loops that makes it more difficult for 
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modellers to represent the climate system accurately. Observations over the next 30 years will 
decrease model uncertainties by supplying researchers with better understandings of how the 
climate responds to change (Watson, 2008).  
Climate sensitivity is the climates’ ability to react to change and ‘measure how fast Earth 
responds to changes in atmospheric CO2 concentration’ (Mauritzen et al., 2017, p.1). This 
climate sensitivity can alter the model uncertainty at different latitudes. 
Uncertainties surrounding how to accurately model solar variability, abrupt climate change, 
land use feedback, dust and biomass, and ozone changes contribute to a model’s overall 
uncertainty within its structural components (National Research Council et al., 2005). Along 
with the previously mentioned interactions between different components of the Earth 
system, the poles include climate interactions not present anywhere else on the globe. The 
representation of clouds and sea ice largely dominate why model uncertainty is more 
prominent over the poles than the global average. Increased time and resources spent on 
model construction and observational datasets are required to decrease model uncertainty for 
the globe and polar regions. Subsequently, modellers can understand climate feedback loops 
through observations, altering models to reflect the appropriate changes, with projections that 
include the processes involved in climate feedback loops and enhanced future temperatures 
becoming more credible and robust. The decrease of model uncertainty is crucial for polar 
regions, as it is the dominating source of uncertainty. 
 
Natural Variability 
As previously discussed by Hawkins and Sutton (2009), Natural Variability occurs in 
response to an absence of radiative forcing at a given time. The internal climate variability 
within a model can disguise or intensify anthropogenic changes in the climate (Hawkins & 
Sutton, 2011). 
Natural Variability plays the most critical role at shorter projection times and more minor 
spatial scales (Hawkins and Sutton 2009). This dissertation’s projections support the 
importance of internal variability over smaller regions, with internal variability being more 
considerable for both the Antarctic and the Arctic than the globe.  
 
Minimising Natural Variability 
Natural variability is higher for regions situated over the poles. The phenomenon of polar 
regions expressing more considerable temperature changes due to perturbations is called 
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polar amplification (Goosse et al., 2018). Goosse et al. (2018) explain that polar amplification 
equates to a more significant natural variability for the poles than the globe. However, Arctic 
polar amplification is greater than the Antarctic. Figure 8 and Figure 9 display the difference 
in natural variability between the Arctic and the Antarctic. Arctic polar amplification is due 
to: 
 
(1) a relatively large and positive lapse rate feedback;  (2) a relatively weak negative Planck 
response; and (3) a sizeable positive surface albedo feedback  (Goosse et al., 2018, p. 7). 
 
Antarctic polar amplification exists but is not as significant as in the Arctic due to a weak 
Planck response and a positive albedo feedback loop.  
Natural variability is higher in regions over the poles, especially in the Arctic, due to internal 
variability associated with polar amplification, atmospheric circulation patterns (Deser et al., 
2012), and sea ice loss (England et al., 2019). 
 
Further evaluations are essential to understand the processes involved within a region’s 
internal variability, both within projections and observations. There will always be natural 
variability within the climate system, however, it is the models ability to accurately represent 
this internal variability that must be advanced. A greater understanding of internal variability 
will decrease the uncertainty in temperature projections and aid with interpreting losses in sea 
ice (Neil C. Swart et al., 2015).  
 
Temperature Projection Uncertainties in the Antarctic 
Variance across all three sources of uncertainty was more significant for the regions situated 
over the poles than for the global average. However, the most crucial source of uncertainty 
impacting the poles is model uncertainty. Supported by previous literature (Hawkins & 
Sutton, 2009, 2011; Mauritzen et al., 2017), the poles incur more significant amounts of total 
uncertainty; however, this dissertation’s crucial finding is that model uncertainty over the 
poles exceeds scenario uncertainty. This exhibits that the poles’ environment is such that the 





Policy advisors working on mitigation and adaptational changes to help the climate must 
acknowledge the heightened uncertainty for polar regions. This acknowledgement is essential 
as the high levels of model uncertainty show that there is a wide range of possibilities of how 
polar regions may respond to global warming, and how much temperature rise may be 
imposed on the regions, depending on different SSP-RCP scenarios. The high model 
uncertainty for polar regions places a low amount of confidence in surface air temperature 
projections. Sources of uncertainty must be minimised for regions over the poles, so a greater 
understanding of how the Arctic and the Antarctic respond to change can be grasped; 
allowing for appropriate decisions to be made, protecting the vulnerable polar regions from 
degradation. Given that model uncertainty is the dominant source of uncertainty for the poles, 
it must be minimised if policymakers can be provided with accurate evidence and data to 
make adaptational decisions. Communication of these Antarctic temperature projection 
uncertainties between the science-policy interface is essential, to ensure policymakers do not 
question temperature projections as credible, relevant and legitimate, and are made aware of 
the need to develop more advanced climate models and comprehensive observational datasets 





Chapter 3: Antarctic Socio-economic Uncertainties  
Section 3.1 Antarctic Socio-economic Element Uncertainties 
Uncertainties are not limited to the science and modelling space of futures studies. The socio-
economic impact that humans have on the Antarctic by visiting the continent and utilising its 
resources also creates various uncertainties.  
 
The following section reviews the uncertainties within Antarctic socio-economic sector, 
using the dashboard of Antarctic socio-economic elements and their associated uncertainties 
(Table 5).  
A definition of each socio-economic element from Table 5 will also be included.  
 
This dashboard is based on the elements proposed by Frame (2020a); however, they have 
been assessed to identify the elements most crucial to the Antarctic’s future. Not all elements 
have associated indicators; however, certain elements have been considered complex enough 
to require sets of indicators. 
 
For ease of reading, the socio-economic elements impacting future Antarctic scenarios (from 
the dashboard Table 5) have been split into seven categories and are listed as follows: 
 
1. Institutions and Governance 
2. Economic Impact 
3. Direct human Impact 
4. Ecological and Environmental Processes 
5. Resource Exploitation 
6. Technological Development 
7. Broader Societal Factors 
 
Chapter 4 will highlight the uncertainties across Antarctic socio-economic elements deemed 
to have the most impact.  
 
As previously discussed, O’Neill et al. (2017) proposed a set of 24 socio-economic elements, 
providing an overview of global challenges to inform adaptation and mitigation strategies in 
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efforts to reduce global emission levels and temperature rise. The global elements proposed 
by O’Neill et al. (2017) are helpful, as they allow study into how each socio-economic 
element can shape future global change. These elements are attached in Table 2.  
 
Building on O’Neill et al. (2017), Frame (2020a) evaluated the 24 global elements and 
reduced them to 17 socio-economic elements that would specifically impact Antarctica’s 
future. The entire dashboard of Antarctic specific elements proposed by Frame (2020a) is 
attached as Table 3. As previously discussed, Frames elements focus on the regional rather 
than global to provide researchers with a more accurate picture of socio-economic and 
political elements pertinent to the Antarctic’s future.  
1. Institutions and Governance 
1.1 Antarctic Governance 
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is the governing mechanism of Antarctica, and the 
Antarctic Treaty is the most fundamental piece of legislation within that system.  The 
Antarctic Treaty was drafted in December 1959 due to international pressures caused by 
territorial claims on the Antarctic following the Cold War (Rothwell & Hemmings, 2018). 
The Treaty was signed to revoke territorial claims and maintain Antarctica as a continent 
preserved for peace and science. With only 14 annexes included within the legislation, the 
Antarctic Treaty reflects Antarctica’s core issues at the time  (Rothwell & Hemmings, 2018). 
Interested parties have grown, and additional groups have since been established to advance 
discussions around concerns that have emerged since 1959. These groups, as well as the 
Treaty itself, form the Antarctic Treaty System.  
The Treaty itself holds little regulative enforcement agency. Instead, disputes or altercations 
are solved through international meetings and discussions (Bunikowski & Hemmings, 2021). 
Originally 12 states signed the Antarctic Treaty, all who now hold consultative party status. 
This number has since grown to 29. Consultative parties have the right to vote and raise a 
voice at the biannual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM). Unlike consultative 
parties, non-consultative states (Observer parties) to the ATS, currently 24, cannot raise 
concerns or voice opinions on Antarctic matters; however, they can still attend ATCMs 
(Rothwell & Hemmings, 2018). The Antarctic Treaty also allows any United Nation (UN) 
member to sign the legislation ("The Antarctic Treaty Explained - British Antarctic Survey," 
n.d.). Although numbers of states signed to the Antarctic Treaty have risen since 1959, it is 
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increasingly difficult for countries to join as consultative parties raising concerns regarding 
the ATS’ exclusivity (Rothwell & Hemmings, 2018). 
1.1a CCAMLR 
In 1980, the ATS established the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (CCAMLR)  to advance further the discussions on Antarctic marine life and 
resources issues 2.  Previous to CCAMLR, the Antarctic Treaty did not include any 
provisions specific to the Antarctic marine environment. Members of CCAMLR are not 
necessarily signatories of the Antarctic Treaty, and although CCAMLR is included within the 
ATS, it is recognised as a separate organisation, as it includes the participation of 
governments that have interests in the Southern Ocean, but not the Antarctic continent 
(Bunikowski & Hemmings, 2021). Each year, CCAMLR meets in Hobart to discuss any 
jurisdictional issues (Hemmings, 2020). 
1.1b Madrid Protocol 
The Madrid (Environmental) Protocol was negotiated at the 11th ATCM and signed in 1991 
(Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, n.d.). The Madrid Protocol focuses on implementing 
environmentally responsible practices and designates Antarctica as a ‘natural reserve.’ The 
Committee for Environmental Protection was developed, with the group providing advice to 
states on how to best conduct themselves whilst on the Continent. Within the legislation, 
ANNEX V was ratified in 2002, designating specific sites or areas to be preserved and 
protected3 (Australian Antarctic Program, 2019).  
 
As will be expanded upon in Chapter 4, Antarctic governance pervades all Antarctic socio-
economic elements. This places great importance on its resilience, relevance and 
effectiveness. As politics evolve and priorities of power or wealth increase, the Antarctic 
could be exploited. There is significant uncertainty with how the ATS will respond to global 
conflict and whether its framework is resilient enough to handle too much global change or 
political pressure (Walt, 2017).  
 
2 Currently, CCAMLR designates the 'Antarctic' ocean boundaries; as anything further south than 60° South 
(Bunikowski & Hemmings, 2021).   




2. Economic Impact 
Antarctica is a continent filled with valuable resources and flora and fauna. The ATS contains 
provisions that outline the desire for the Antarctic continent to be reserved for peace and 
science. Nevertheless, there are increasing pressures to advance economic development in the 
region at the potential expense of the environment. The uncertainties within the space 
constrain the ability for Antarctica to remain environmentally protected from potential 
economic elements such as bioprospecting, fisheries and tourism. 
2.1 Bioprospecting  
Biological prospecting (commonly bioprospecting) is the investigation of flora and fauna for 
commercial and medicinal purposes. It involves multiple steps, from ‘discovery and sampling 
to subsequent research and development, manufacturing and marketing’ (Herber, 2006, p. 
139).  
Therefore, bioprospecting has benefits for both scientific and academic research purposes, 
and industry-specific priorities, with ‘the interface between the two often obscure’ (Herber, 
2006, p. 139). Practised globally, bioprospecting in Antarctica is gaining an increasing 
amount of interest (Senior, 2004).  
 
To ensure the activity of bioprospecting upholds the aims of the ATS, it needs to be 
sufficiently regulated. There is a need for a policy specifically on the regulation and 
management of bioprospecting in Antarctica. This policy must work with current 
international laws and the ATS (Herber, 2006; Senior, 2004). The ATS currently does not 
explicitly state any rules specific to bioprospecting; however, the Madrid Protocol broadly 
aims to limit any environmental degradation resulting from Antarctic activities, including 
adverse effects on flora and fauna (Senior, 2004). The Madrid Protocol facilitates cooperation 
between signatory treaty parties to plan and implement any activities or scientific endeavours. 
The inclusion of Environmental Impact Assessments before any scientific activity ensures 
that any Antarctic bioprospecting is analysed to assess any impact on organisms or their 
surrounding environment.  
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provide frameworks and regulations for biological activities, 
including bioprospecting. However, the CBD and UNCLOS have limitations in managing 
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bioprospecting explicitly in Antarctica (Herber, 2006). The CBD has jurisdiction over state 
territories, and the UNCLOS has jurisdiction over international waters, but neither directly 
refer to bioprospecting in Antarctica. The Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) 
could be adapted to include Antarctica within its structure, but this would create issues 
regarding how the ATS and the BBNJ may compete for jurisdictional rights (Nickels, 2020).  
 
It appears that current provisions within the  Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol only 
discuss bioprospecting as a scientific-based activity. Nevertheless, with increasing 
technology and a heightened interest in Antarctica’s role within the medicinal and 
commercial sphere, Antarctic bioprospecting will likely increase in the future in ways other 
than scientific research. (Senior, 2004)  
 
The lack of Antarctic bioprospecting regulation is of grave concern and creates considerable 
uncertainty. Currently, control over bioprospecting depends on the cooperation of states 
within the boundaries of vague rules. The uncertain future of Antarctic governance controls 
the future of bioprospecting and its subsequent impact on the Antarctic environment and 
ecosystem. 
2.2 Fisheries 
The most up to date information and statistics on Antarctic fisheries are from the CCAMLR 
website (CCAMLR, 2019). All fishing vessels operating in the Southern Ocean must report 
catch data to CCAMLR on a daily basis to continue to fish in the region. Krill, Toothfish and 
Icefish are the three most common types of catch in the Southern Ocean. CCAMLR provides 
an open-access statistical database on the catch history for all three and overviews based on 
country (CCAMLR, 2019).  
 
 Currently, CCAMLR manages how many of each species of fish can be caught by fisheries4. 
With CCAMLR being a subsidiary of the ATS, the Antarctic Treaty must be upheld so 
CCAMLR can continue to protect and monitor these waters. However, the uncertainty lies 
with the strength of the ATS. Governments that currently govern the fishing in the Southern 
ocean can face domestic political or fiscal pressures that could impact their contribution in 
 
4 Specific catch numbers on toothfish, icefish and krill are attached in Appendix 2.  
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the area. Likewise, the international rules-based order has little influence over powerful 
nations that exploit existing agreements. 
 
Furthermore, Antarctic marine ecosystems within the Antarctic can be impacted by 
environmental change. Ecosystem, environment, and predator change are all examples of 
changes that may alter how a fish species inhabits its environment (Antarctic and Southern 
Ocean Coalition, 2020). How krill will react to environmental factors is important as catch 
numbers are so significant5. The specific uncertainties regarding krill are associated with 
inaccurate estimations of population size and how they will respond to ocean warming 
(Bender, 2006; Meyer et al., 2020).  
 
Limited knowledge of individual species life cycle leads to further uncertainties within the 
Antarctic fishing industry. For example, toothfish are incredibly long-living species, in which 
there are uncertainties associated with how they may respond or recover from overfishing 
(Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, 2020). Although CCAMLR may set yearly catch 
limits on toothfish, it is unknown if this regulation assures sustainable fishing (Antarctic and 
Southern Ocean Coalition, 2020).  
2.3 Tourism 
The International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) is a non-profit industry 
alliance formed in 1991, regulating the exposure of tourism in Antarctica ("IAATO & The 
Antarctic Treaty - IAATO," n.d.). In 2011, it was decided at the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings (ATCM) to adopt the General Guidelines for Visitors to the Antarctic 
under resolution 3. This provided tourism companies and organisations with a set of 
regulations and guidelines before allowing tourists to visit the continent. All visitors are 
required to adhere to the Antarctic Treaty rules, which include completing appropriate 
permits before visiting specific regions ("IAATO & The Antarctic Treaty - IAATO," n.d.). 
 
Since 1991 IAATO has been collecting annual tourist data. Information is gathered on 
nationality and whether tourists visiting on vessels are landed. (IAATO, 2020a). Tourist 
numbers increased by 600% from 1991 to 2013. Below is a summary of data from the latest 
years (2018-2019). 
 





Total tourists (Landed and Cruise Based) : 55,489 
Landing Tourists: 44,600 
Cruise only: 10,889 
The majority (32%) of these (total) tourists were from the USA, with 15% of tourists from 
China and 12% from Australia.  
 
IAATO provides fact sheets for public use, along with statistics, describing past trends in 
tourism numbers.  
 
Figure 10 Total Antarctic visitor numbers from 1965-2018 (IAATO, 2019) 
As shown in Figure 10, there has been an increase in tourism to Antarctica since 1965. There 
was a sharp decline in numbers following 2009, to which IAATO attributes this to the 
financial crisis. A similar trend is expected following the impact of COVID-19, which has 
seen a sharp decline in cruise tourism globally and in Antarctica. It is theorized by Frame and 
Hemmings (2020) that due to many cruise companies shutting down, it will be challenging 
for the Antarctic cruise industry to recover from COVID-19 (Frame & Hemmings, 2020).  
 
In October 2020, IAATO released a statement that  COVID-19 may not impact Antarctic 
tourism to the extent it was affected by the 2009 financial crisis, as vaccinations could play a 
role. However, vaccinations are still a future thought, with tourism to the Antarctic having to 
undergo an extensive recovery period (IAATO, 2020c). Furthermore, as international travel 
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recommences, the challenges posed to Antarctic tourism will be prominent, with quarantines 
and regulations likely to be imposed (Frame & Hemmings, 2020). It is also possible that due 
to changing technologies and a changing world, the future of Antarctic tourism may take an 
entirely new format (Frame & Hemmings, 2020).  
 
Not only are the numbers of tourists difficult to predict, the future of Antarctic tourism and its 
indirect effects on the environment will be heavily impacted by the modes of transportation 
used. A tourist on a cruise ship uses more energy than an individual travelling by plane 
(Walnum, 2011). Holland & Holland (2012) state that ‘a cruise liner such as Queen Mary 2 
emits 0.43kg of CO2 per passenger mile, compared with 0.257kg for a long-haul flight’ 
(Holland & Holland, 2012 p. 64).  
 
The uncertainty regarding the future mode of travel will impact the climate adding to the 
emergency. Figure 10 depicts cruise ship tourism to the Antarctic, increasing more than air 
travel over the past 50 years. Depending on the preferential mode of tourism in Antarctica, 
the amount of GHG emissions released in the Antarctic atmosphere could increase or 
decrease.  
 
Other uncertainties regarding tourism include the impact on the natural environment, 
influenced by regulations and tourist numbers. 
Given the isolation and difficult weather conditions that the continent has, any tourism 
ventures come with a level of risk and uncertainty (Amelung & Lamers, 2005). This can be 
seen in the Erebus disaster case, when a passenger plane crashed into Erebus mountain, 
killing 257 people. The Erebus crash not only was a disaster that cost multiple human lives 
but also prompted an expensive and challenging search and rescue effort, along with 
impacting the surrounding environment (Amelung & Lamers, 2005). 
3. Direct Human Impact 
3.1 Research Community and Support 
Further are the uncertainties regarding science and the upkeeping of research stations. The 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCP) have not directly responded to these challenges 




There are 112 research facilities located in Antarctica. These comprise 84 stations, 11 camps, 
six refuges, six airfield camps, two laboratories and three depots. Forty-one of these total 
stations are open year-round, whilst the remaining 71 are seasonal stations. 
 
Uncertainties within the Antarctic research community range from environmental impacts of 
stations and transport, to individual mishaps when working in the Antarctic environment. 
Although treaties such as the Madrid Protocol are in place to prevent any adverse 
environmental impacts due to research on the ice, mistakes resulting from human error, or 
unknowns, can still occur. 
 
In 2018 the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) developed a 
database to store information regarding the direct impact humans have on the Antarctic 
environment (COMNAP, 2018). The database currently includes fourteen sets of elements, 
all providing data on specific variables that National Antarctic Programmes (NAPs) or 
organisations within the Antarctic Treaty System can use and analyse6.  
3.2 Physical Impact  
3.2a Search and Rescue 
In 2019, COMNAP produced a report suggesting how to improve search and rescue 
coordination across parties (COMNAP, 2019). Critically, it was noted that search and rescue 
efforts increased with increased ‘science, tourism, fisheries and commercial aviation with 
routing that crosses below 60° South’ (COMNAP, 2019, pg. 4). 
 
Economically, search and rescue to a remote region such as Antarctica can be costly due to 
temperature extremes, reduced daylight hours, and storms that make search and rescue efforts 
difficult (N. Mills & H. Mills, 2011). Any search and rescue operations in Antarctica depend 
on the specific situation and involve many uncertainties. Successful search and rescue efforts 
are dependent on operational planning and coordinated efforts between NAPs (N. Mills and 
H. Mills, 2011, p.41). 
 
6 The COMNAP database is not freely accessible to the public; however, the COMNAP website does include a 
comprehensive set of data on Antarctic field stations and any vessels employed by NAPs.  
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Unsuccessful search and rescue efforts can result in further accidents that can negatively 
affect the surrounding Antarctic environment and ecosystems.  
 
Communication between Rescue Coordination Centres (RCC’s) and NAPs is crucial to the 
success of a search and rescue effort (N. Mills and H. Mills, 2011). All countries with RCC 
jurisdiction must work cohesively and align priorities of sharing and distributing resources to 
the Antarctic. The five countries with RCC jurisdiction are the five gateway cities to 
Antarctica and all are original signatories of the ATS. The ATS’s success is crucial in 
maintaining  Antarctic search and rescue priorities and facilitating effective communication 
between the five RCC’s and NAPs. 
3.2b Microplastics/Carbon Footprint 
The presence of microplastics in Antarctica is a recent and emerging area of research. The 
majority of current studies focus on the presence of microplastics in the Antarctic marine 
environment (Waller et al., 2017; Evangeliou et al., 2020).   
However, in recent years, studies are starting to emerge that have found microplastics within 
Antarctic ice cores and land (ice) based microplastics. The distribution of terrestrial-based 
microplastics is most likely due to atmospheric transport (Kelly et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 
2020).Studies have suggested that microplastics may have been distributed from local 
sources, such as national Antarctic stations.  
 
A research station’s carbon footprint is challenging to assess, as it involves the estimation of 
the amount of fuel used by individual stations, traverse trips, transportation, and research 
field trips; however it has been stated that there is a large carbon footprint present within the 
human Antarctic scientific research community (Winter, 2019). Along with the carbon 
footprint produced by transportation and the upkeeping of stations, oil spills and accidental 
pollution can occasionally occur. This has a detrimental impact on the surrounding ecosystem 
and environment (Bargagli, 2008). Therefore, it is a priority for NAPs to issue statements and 
plans that help to prevent these accidents and minimize the carbon footprint of researchers 
and stations (British Antarctic Survey, 2015; Antarctica New Zealand, 2020).  
 
Accidental contamination can result from human error or abnormal weather conditions or 
events. It is difficult to prevent these issues from occurring. However, the presence of 
environmental impact statements (Antarctica New Zealand, 2020) and other methods that 
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NAPs employ to report incidents, allow trends to be examined, potentially decreasing 
accidental spills from occurring in the future. New emerging technologies may make 
pollution easier to manage, with zero-emission stations being a possibility in the future 
(Winter, 2019). However, this is still an uncertainty, as technologies that do not exist yet pose 
questions regarding their side effects, ability to work, and development timeframe. 
 
Underlying all these uncertainties is the continuing ability of the ATS to uphold measures to 
maintain the protection of the environment. Whilst NAP’s commit to uphold environmental 
protection in the region, if signatory nations’ priorities change, there will be increased 
pressure on the ATS, possibly at the expense of the Antarctic continent’s environmental 
protection. 
3.2c Wildlife 
Outlined by Woehler et al. (2014), the presence of humans on the Antarctic continent can be 
split into four categories; 
 
1. tourism and non-governmental activities,  
2. scientific research,  
3. commercial fisheries and; 
4. whaling7 
 
Effects of these four categories can all have direct negative impacts on wildlife. The 
introduction of disease and or non-native species are additional threats to Antarctic wildlife, 
not classified as ‘direct’ human interactions.  
 
Tourism 
With increased Antarctic tourism comes increased direct human engagement. Cruise ships 
deliver people to shore, where humans interact with the environment. As explained 
previously, although IAATO monitors and provides regulations for tourism companies to 
follow, there is no monitoring of the impact humans have on population dynamics and 
disturbances (Woehler et al., 2014).  
 
 




Antarctic stations are often on ice-free areas, therefore taking up space where wildlife would 
originally nest and raise their young (Woehler et al., 2014). Woehler (2014) explains that any 
research stations built after the signing of the Madrid Protocol would have been subject to an 
Environmental Impact Assessment. Any impacts that the building process may have had on 
the continent would have been evaluated and minimised if possible. The largest 
contamination source from research is oil and fuel spills and sewage runoff, which usually is 
only minimally treated (Woehler et al., 2014).  
 
Commercial Fisheries 
Whilst the role of CCAMLR is to regulate Antarctic fishing, unregulated, illegal fishing 
continues (Woehler, 2014). Woehler (2014) further states that illegal fishing continues to 
create an environment highly unsustainable to a range of Antarctic fish species. As 
technology advances, fishing of krill will also likely increase, which will affect the overall 
krill population, impacting the surrounding ecosystem. (Woehler et al., 2014).   
4. Ecological and Environmental Processes 
4.1 Physical environment 
4.1a Temperature  
Global Temperature Observations 
The IPCC states that the climate system has been warming and accumulating heat since 1998 
(IPCC, 2014). Human-induced greenhouse gases and natural variability contribute to the rise 
in CO2 concentrations, which affect the radiative forcing and subsequent temperature present 
within the climate system (IPCC, 2014, p.43). Although the climate system has warmed over 
the past decade, there are fluctuations in this increased rate due to changes in natural 
variability, with volcanic and solar cycle cooling. Despite this, the climate system has 
increased in heat uptake more significantly than the previous average, primarily due to the 
oceans’ ability to absorb heat (IPCC, 2014, p.43).   
 
Antarctic Temperature 
The IPCC summarises past trends of air surface temperature within the Antarctic continent in 
their report on Polar Regions (IPCC, 2019). Figure 11 shows how these RCP scenarios may 
affect the Antarctic (SCAR, 2017). Over the past 30-50 years, there were non-consistent 
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Antarctic surface air temperatures, with warming observed over the West Antarctic ice sheet 
but no rise over the East Antarctic ice sheet. The explanation for this is the variability within 
the oceans’ ability to uptake heat and variable atmospheric circulation patterns (IPCC, 2019). 
Furthermore, the report discusses the interaction between air surface temperatures and the 
Antarctic ozone hole. The report states that ‘ozone depletion has been the dominant driver of 
the positive trend in the Southern Annular Mode (SAM) during austral summer from the late 
1970s to the late 1990s’ (IPCC, 2019, p. 212). 
4.1b Oceanographic  
Observed Changes in Ocean  
The ocean has incurred the most dramatic warming out of the entire climate system absorbing 
the majority of energy ‘with only about 1% stored in the atmosphere’ (IPCC, 2014, p.40). 
The warming is most significant near the surface, warming approximately 0.11°C per decade 
over 1971-2010. In terms of ocean makeup, the IPCC states that ‘it is very likely that regions 
of high surface salinity, where evaporation dominates, have become more saline, while 
regions of low salinity, where precipitation dominates, have become fresher since the 1950s’ 
(IPCC, 2014, p.40). This means that fish species will have to adapt to warmer temperatures 
and increased salinity levels raising further uncertainties. 




Predicted Changes in Ocean  
As observed, the ocean will continue to warm throughout the 21st century, with the most 
dramatic warming occurring in the upper ocean, in tropical and northern regions (IPCC, 
2014). The Southern Ocean will incur the most significant deep ocean warming (IPCC, 
2014).  
 
Observed Changes in Sea Level 
The IPCC explains the recent sea-level trends, with an average rise of 0.19m from 1901-
2010, with the rate of increase higher than the previous two millennia (IPCC, 2014). This 
increase is due to the combination of thermal expansion and glacier melt (IPCC, 2014). 
Ocean circulation dominates the observed average sea level in any given region. The average 
for any broad area can be several times larger or smaller than the global mean.  
 
Predicted Changes in Sea Level 
With warming oceans and air temperature, sea level will continue to rise throughout the 21st 
century (IPCC, 2014). The IPCC projects that global sea level will rise under all RCP 
scenarios, with the rate of increase being more extensive than the observed 2mm/yr rate 
(IPCC, 2014). This sea level, however, as observed, will not increase at the same rate across 
different regions, with approximately 70% of global coastlines experiencing a rise in sea level 
of more or less than 20% of the global mean (IPCC, 2014). 
4.1c Cryosphere 
Observed Changes in Cryosphere 
Ice sheets from both Greenland and Antarctica have been melting and contributing to sea-
level rise over the past two decades (IPCC, 2014). The trend in the loss of sea ice in the 
Arctic is apparent, with sea ice decreasing in the region every decade since 1979. This trend 
is observed differently in the Antarctic, where the loss of sea ice is due to regional variability 
(IPCC, 2014).  
 
Predicted Changes in Cryosphere 
There are projections for significant reductions in Arctic sea ice, with an RCP8.5 scenario 
resulting in medium confidence that the Arctic Ocean will eventually be virtually ice-free in 
the summer months (IPCC, 2014). The predictions for sea ice changes are similar in the 
Antarctic; there will be a reduction in sea ice, but predicted with low confidence. 
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All glaciers (excluding Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets) are projected to decrease in 
volume. RCP2.6 projections decrease glacier volume from 15-55%, whilst RCP8.5 decrease 
glacier volume from 35-85%, predicted with medium confidence (IPCC, 2014).  
 
With increasing climate troubles, the impact of global warming on the Antarctic is a subject 
of increasing relevance. Hughes (2018) states that the IPCC interacts with the ATS through 
communication with the ATCM and the Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research 
(SCAR). The IPCC aims to provide information regarding climate change, and by working 
with SCAR, it can communicate important information to ATCP.  
 
Uncertainties in predicting and measuring the Antarctic physical environment result from 
unknowns and uncertainties within modelling. These, as previously described in this 
dissertation, are modelling uncertainty, natural variability and scenario uncertainty (Hawkins 
& Sutton, 2009).  
 
However, uncertainties involving the future of the Antarctic environment are also associated 
with individual countries’ response to climate change and global efforts. Increased 
communication between the IPCC and the ATS members allows a more cohesive response to 
climate change, as the adverse effects of global warming threaten to impact the Antarctic 
continent in a way that disrupts the preservation of the Antarctic as a region for peace and 
science. Any disruption to the successful operation of the ATS would decrease the benefits of 
cohesiveness and collective response.  
4.2 Ecological processes 
The CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program (CEMP) was established in 1989 as a long 
term programme monitoring the population of keystone species (Agnew, 1997). A change in 
populations of keystone species will reflect a change in the overall ecosystem’s health or 
prosperity. The CEMP works to  
 
1. recognise any changes in species size or critical parts of the ecosystem. 
2. determine whether changes are results of environmental change or mainly due to 




CEMP was set up to determine how ecological processes are changing due to global warming 
and increased human activity with the environment. The uncertainties surrounding ecological 
processes are very much dependent on future change and how Antarctic ecosystems will 
respond to that change.  
Similar to previously discussed socio-economic elements, the monitoring and subsequent 
knowledge of how ecological processes will change in the Antarctic is also dependent on the 
ATS’s success. There is a possibility that long term monitoring programmes like CEMP 
would be discontinued if the ATS was not functioning as it should. 
4.3. Biological Invasions of Non-Native Species 
The increasing presence of humans in the Antarctic increases the risk of bringing Non-Native 
species to the continent accidentally. These species can be of high risk to Antarctic native 
species as they can bring disease or damage the ecosystems by disruption. Literature suggests 
that the highest risk of biological invasions of non-native species to the Antarctic is in the 
Southern Islands and close to the Antarctic peninsula (Hughes et al., 2015, 2020; McGeoch et 
al., 2015). These northern areas of the continent are ones frequently visited by tourists, with 
large numbers of people being shipped or flown in at any given time.  
 
The uncertainties with a biological invasion of non-native species increase as tourism 
increases. Uncertainties arise with the compliance of tourism companies and individuals with 
IAATO rules, the ability of the Antarctic Treaty System to enforce the regulations, and the 
continuation of the IAATO if the ATS is dysfunctional. 
5. Resource Exploitation 
5.1 Minerals extraction 
Coal and iron ore are present beneath the Antarctic ice sheets; however, mining to obtain 
these minerals is challenging and expensive (Australian Antarctic Program, 2020; Coburn, 
2018). Due to the challenges posed by the climate and conditions, the prospect of mining in 
Antarctica is currently unprofitable (Cullen, 1994).  
 
The Madrid Protocol bans all mining in Antarctica due to the negative environmental 
impacts. However, the protocol only enforces the ban on mining until 2048, when it will be 
reviewed. There is uncertainty surrounding the ‘warming climate and advent of new 
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technologies’ (Coburn, 2018, p.1), affecting how safe, profitable, and environmentally 
friendly mining could be in the Antarctic. Therefore, these uncertainties will direct the future 
of Antarctic mining, potentially making extraction a realistic venture in the future. 
6. Technological Development 
6.1 Research priorities 
In 2014, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) published a horizon scan 
for future Antarctic research priorities (SCAR, 2014). Future priorities were decided by 75 
scientists and policy experts, combining various topics and subject matters. The six broad 
research  categories were to: 
1. ‘define the global reach of the Antarctic atmosphere and the Southern Ocean; 
2. understand how, where and why ice sheets lose mass; 
3. reveal Antarctica’s history; 
4. learn how Antarctic life evolved and survived; 
5. observe space and the Universe; and 
6. recognise and mitigate human influences’ (SCAR, 2014). 
The six categories of research priorities define where current and future funding and 
resources will be allocated, including technology development. However, as O’Reilly (2018) 
pointed out, research must be directed towards, or applicable for, policy-makers, with science 
not always being automatically accepted. Research must be conducted that is geared towards 
fitting into the complex workings of a policy world rather than focusing on the science alone 
(O’Reilly, 2018). The climate emergency demands immediate action. Unless climate research 
conducted in the Antarctic is built to run alongside policy, positive changes to the 
environment will not occur as quickly as desired.  
Uncertainties within future research priorities for the Antarctic are minimised by the SCAR 
horizon scan, as research is given importance. However, research focuses change as priorities 
or funding allocation changes. There is uncertainty surrounding the specific directions that 





A developing technology within the Antarctic is the concept of geoengineering glaciers. This 
giant engineering project would physically intervene with glacial melt to slow sea-level rise. 
Scientists proposing the concept believe it is essential to take a next-level approach to pre-
emptively stop sea-level rise (Moore et al., 2018).Furthermore, global engineering efforts, 
particularly the ability to remove CO2 directly from the atmosphere, could help to tackle the 
climate emergency (Shepherd, 2012).  
 
The concept of geoengineering in the Antarctic has been criticised though, with its potential 
impact on the environment being questioned (Moore et al., 2018). When viewed within the 
context of a risk society, geoengineering would further use developments in science and 
technology to help solve the unintended consequences of industrialisation; nevertheless, this 
in itself could incur more unintended ‘bads’. Geoengineering in the Antarctic is still a 
concept yet to be used within the continent and it’s future depends on the future priorities of 
governments and NAPs. 
7. Broader Societal Factors 
7.1 Dominant global attitudes to the environment 
Global attitudes to the environment will influence how the Antarctic’s future is managed. For 
the ATS to maintain power and legislative control, signature states must continue to prioritise 
the importance of the environment.  
 
A 2018 study conducted by the Pew Research Centre found that most countries surveyed 
viewed climate change as a significant threat (Fagan & Huang, 2019). However, this was not 
the case in all countries, with 20% of countries viewing climate change as a minor threat and 
9% believing it is not a threat. It was found that countries with a higher level of education had 
increased amounts of people believing that climate change was a significant threat (Fagan & 
Huang, 2019). 
 
The dominating view towards climate change and the environment will dictate the future of 
the Antarctic continent. If enough states believe that mitigating climate change is a top 
priority, then research directions and governing bodies will reflect this view.. The Pew study 
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found that the number of countries that viewed climate change as a significant threat had 
increased since 2013 (Fagan & Huang, 2019).  
7.2 Ontological Uncertainty: COVID-19  
COVID -19 is an example of ontological uncertainty. With no warning, COVID-19 has 
impacted the globe and the Antarctic on an unprecedented scale. COVID-19 has provided 
many uncertainties within the Antarctic socio-economic space. It is unknown how tourism 
will respond to the pandemic, with current tourism to the Antarctic suspended (Frame & 
Hemmings, 2020). Using the global financial crisis as an example, it could be possible that 
tourism does not return to previous levels for ten years. When tourism does increase to levels 
similar to pre-COVID-19, there is uncertainty surrounding what form Antarctic tourism will 
take.  
Similarly, Antarctic research has decreased due to COVID-19 (Frame & Hemmings, 2020). 
This raises questions regarding the future of Antarctic research and what effects it will have if 
it continues to decline.  
 
As previously outlined, Antarctic Governance and decision making via the ATS occurs at the 
annual ATCMs, and the yearly CCAMLR meetings in Hobart (Hemmings, 2020).  
 
The 2020 ATCM meeting was cancelled due to the coronavirus pandemic. The next 
scheduled ATCM meeting is due to be held in Paris, France, from the 14th-24th of June 2021 
(Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2020).  
 
IAATO held a meeting on July 3rd 2020, to discuss the industry response to COVID-19. The 
meeting was held virtually; however, it was seen as a positive occasion, with the introduction 
of a ‘COVID-19 steering group’, highlighting the difficulties that COVID-19 has presented to 
Antarctic tourism, and how these challenges may be overcome (IAATO, 2020b).  
 
CCAMLR held its yearly meeting online, from the 27th to 30th October 2020 (CCAMLR, 
2020b), despite COVID-19. The issues of importance discussed included;  
 
• ‘agreed precautionary catch limits for all toothfish fisheries in the Convention Area; 
significant progress towards a new approach to managing the krill fisheries; 
• one vessel was added to the Contracting Party IUU-Vessel List; and  
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• two projects approved for funding under its new General Capacity Building Fund and 
climate change and Marine Protected Areas’ (CCAMLR, 2020b) 
 
Holding meetings online allows for discussions to proceed irrespective of localised issues or 
conflicts that may obstruct individuals attending meetings in person. The flexibility of 






Chapter 4: Antarctic Uncertainty in a Risk Society 
Section 4.1 Converging Uncertainties  
This dissertation aims to answer the question: 
How do the physical uncertainties associated with Antarctic climate model 
projections, and Antarctic socio-economic uncertainties combine, to question the 
credibility, relevance and legitimacy of Antarctic scenarios? 
 
Having researched Beck’s risk society and observing Antarctic physical and socio-economic 
uncertainties within this context, there are three concluding remarks that deserve mention. 
The first conclusion is that modelling uncertainty is the dominant source of physical 
uncertainty for Antarctic surface air temperature projections. Model uncertainty must be 
minimised by advancing climate models, so policymakers are provided with accurate 
scientific data to make adaptational decisions. Furthermore, the model uncertainty must be 
communicated between the science-policy interface, to ensure policymakers do not question 
temperature projections as credible, relevant and legitimate. 
 
The second concluding remark is that the most critical socio-economic uncertainty impacting 
the future of the Antarctic is the resilience of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). 
The third and final conclusion is that climate change is a wicked problem. Within a risk 
societal lens, and in a world plagued by post-truth politics, the associated challenges of a 
wicked problem mean that climate change uncertainties are intensified.  
 
The second and third concluding remarks above will be further discussed in this chapter, 
along with the dashboard presented in Chapter 3 (Table 5) outlining how these can be utilised 
for further work. The importance of model uncertainty as a physical uncertainty will not be 
discussed in this Chapter, as it has already been analysed in Chapter 2. 
4.1.1 Antarctic Uncertainties and a Risk Society  
By evaluating the socio-economic elements and identifying their associated uncertainties in 
the dashboard (Table 5) total uncertainty, along with scenario uncertainty, can be minimised.  
Each Antarctic socio-economic element had sperate uncertainties in its trends and 
developments; however, the Antarctic governance system pervades all Antarctic elements. 
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Increased threats to the ATS would disrupt all elements and lead to a higher uncertainty 
within the Antarctic.  
 
Threats to the Antarctic Treaty System 
When the ATS was signed in 1959, the political environment was different from now 
(Bunikowski and Hemmings, 2021; Haward, 2017). One of the Antarctic Treaty’s most 
significant drivers was the discussion of territorial claims on the Antarctic around the Cold 
War (Rothwell & Hemmings, 2018). With a focus on de-militarisation, the Antarctic 
continent was where, politically, states could assert dominance. The cold war highlighted 
what could occur when states became too power-hungry. The Antarctic Treaty was then 
signed to neither recognise nor dispute any territorial claims previously made on the 
Antarctic.  
The ATS relies on signatories cooperation and compliance (Bunikowski & Hemmings, 
2021). As time has progressed from the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, political alignments 
and priorities have shifted, with many states showing an interest in the Antarctic for 
economic reasons that might damage the continent environmentally (Walt, 2017; Harvie, 
2019). To reflect this, the ATS has expanded to include legislation focused upon issues such 
as marine harvesting, mineral exploitation and sealing (Bunikowski & Hemmings, 2021).  
 
However, Antarctic governance remains centred around peace and science. Bunikowski and 
Hemmings (2021) state that ‘The ATS is a notionally open access system with a very thick 
glass ceiling in terms of the technical, scientific, administrative and financial prowess 
necessary to break through and operate substantially in the Antarctic’ (Bunikowski and 
Hemmings, 2021, p.18). In this view, the ATS is set up, so only a select few states are given 
the power to negotiate changes or alterations in how business is conducted in the Antarctic.  
Consultative parties dictate activities within the ATS. It is not easy to become a consultative 
party (Rothwell & Hemmings, 2018) and the ATS restricts consultative status to countries 
with enough wealth to participate in Antarctic scientific endeavours. 
Science, in Western culture, equates to knowledge and rising power. The involvement of 
Asian countries in the Antarctic has progressed in recent years (Haward, 2013); however, the 
ATS heavily reflects a westernised society (Bunikowski & Hemmings, 2021). 
Nevertheless, China is an example of a state that is developing into a ‘polar great power’ 
(Harvie, 2019a) increasing its scientific presence in Antarctica, exhibited by its growing 
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number of research stations. Professor Anne-Marie Brady has discussed China’s involvement 
in the Antarctic and that their increasing interest in military activity and mineral exploitation 
is increasing the pressure on the ATS (Harvie, 2019b). Antarctica’s size and lack of territorial 
claims have turned it into a political asset, with the potential for conflict regarding which 
superpower states have the most control over Antarctica’s economic assets.  
 
In 1959, the 12 original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty all had aligned priorities, with the 
distinction between military and civilian extremely clear (Bunikowski and Hemmings, 2021). 
Nowadays, the lines separating Antarctic military and civilian roles are blurred, with 
cooperation occurring for transportation, communication, or access to technology and 
facilities. With increased membership and heightened military presence in the Antarctic, 
there is rising Western anxiety surrounding the change in states’ priorities and capabilities 
concerning Antarctic engagement (Bunikowski and Hemmings, 2021). Currently, there is not 
enough imbalance of power or political tension to break ATS agreements. However, as 
politics evolve and priorities of power or wealth increase, Antarctic exploitation could occur. 
The ATS includes language and assumptions about the political and social world that are not 
relevant to today’s Antarctic activities, which raises significant uncertainty with how the ATS 
will respond to global conflict and whether its framework is resilient enough to handle too 
much global change or political pressure (Walt, 2017). 
 
The ATS impacts all socio-economic elements in Antarctica, and therefore, questions 
regarding it’s resilience significantly raise the level of uncertainties. 
 
Risk Society 
This dissertation concludes that the major concepts introduced in this study combine to create 
a challenging space for the public to accept climate change, which in turn creates 
impediments to exploring ways to overcome it. Climate change as a wicked problem is 
difficult for policy to overcome (Camillus, 2008). A risk society places pressure on 
governments to act and provide solutions for wicked problems; however, the presence of 
post-truth politics within a risk society provides politicians with potential excuses from being 




Instead of proposing new ideas or admitting partial defeat in solving climate change, post-
truth politics allows politicians to undermine the credibility of climate change, therefore 
disputing the need to take political action (Bufacchi, 2020). In a world of a risk society, there 
is less trust surrounding scientific institutions and organisations, giving leaders such as 
Donald trump the ability to appeal to the public’s general mistrust, denying climate change 
altogether (Spoelstra, 2020). A risk society provides governments and leaders with the perfect 
opportunity to appeal to the public’s mistrust and avoid finding a solution to a problem 
deemed too challenging to tackle. 
As previously explained, the most significant uncertainty within the Antarctic continent is the 
ATS’s future, and this uncertainty is magnified within the world of a risk society. The politics 
of a risk society may place more pressure on individual signatories to the ATS because of 
domestic priorities, which could question the ATS’s ability to maintain control and regulate 
Antarctic activities. Tensions could occur between significant signatories of the ATS. With 
the Antarctic governance structure relying on signatories’ cooperation, the ATS’s ability to 
deal with international conflict could be tested, particularly dealing with differing views in 
bioprospecting and mineral exploitation.   
Climate change is a wicked problem that will affect the globe but can drastically change the 
future of Antarctica. If Antarctica is to be protected from future environmental degradation, 
then any uncertainties that could lead to facts being misconstrued must be minimised. The 
minimisation of uncertainties within Antarctic future studies and climate modelling will 
allow these tools to be more credible, relevant and legitimate.  
Section 4.2 Final Conclusions 
4.2.1 Antarctic Dashboard and Limitations 
The research conducted in this dissertation was cross-disciplinary. Modelling was completed 
to identify the significance of scenario uncertainty, model uncertainty, and natural variability 
on the Antarctic’s temperature projections using the most recent CMIP6 models. Research 
also analysed and identified uncertainties present within the Antarctic socio-economic space.  
 
This study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of all the physical and socio-economic 
topics frequently discussed in Antarctic futures work. Thus, this study has various limitations 






Only 19 models were used for the global temperature uncertainty projections and 18 for the 
Antarctic and Arctic temperature uncertainties projections.  
If this work were a model-based study, with a more specific focus on the uncertainties in 
climate models alone, then it would be recommended that a larger dataset, all the CMIP6 
models available, would be used for the globe and Antarctic temperature uncertainty 
modelling. 
 
Furthermore, only one realisation from each of these 19 models was used for this 
dissertation’s temperature uncertainties portion. If this study were to be further developed, it 
would be appropriate to use as many realisations that CMIP6 models produce to allow for a 
greater sample set and, subsequently, results representing the uncertainty of all CMIP6 
models and realisations.  
 
Using only one realisation and only 19 models may have limited the accuracy of the results in 
this study, as it is not representative of all CMIP6 data. However, due to this experiment 
using 19 CMIP6 models, the smaller dataset is not likely to have skewed results considerably. 
It is considered that the major trends observed would be similar to those observed if a more 
extensive dataset was used. 
 
When referring to this dissertation’s socio-economic portion, the research completed also 
contains several limitations that could be refined if the study was not cross-disciplinary. 
 
Each socio-economic element was researched to provide background on its definition and 
past trends. This research was done using a variety of online sources and peer-reviewed 
papers. However, to develop this research further, it would be advised that more time be 
spent on each element, with more extensive databases analysed. Contacting ATS 
representatives or researchers that have relevance to the element in question are ways that 
research into socio-economic elements could be further refined.  
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Furthermore, once this data had been acquired, trends could be mathematically analysed and 
graphically displayed, such that readers have a greater understanding of any patterns present 
within the data.  
 
The dashboard presented in this study aimed to cover the most significant uncertainties; 
however, a potential weakness is its ability to capture more minor uncertainties. Given more 
research time and capabilities, this dashboard could be advanced and expanded to include 
more minor Antarctic uncertainties. 
 
The dashboard was created from Frame’s (2020a) Antarctic socio-economic dashboard, 
representing the elements that will impact the Antarctic’s future. However, this dashboard 
was made subjectively, with no set regulations defining what elements should be included. 
Subsequently, a further limitation is that readers may disagree with the elements and 
uncertainties included within the dashboard. 
4.2.2 Future Work 
This dissertation aims to complete the first two steps within the DAPP process, identifying 
and addressing the uncertainties within the Antarctic, providing more informed policy advice. 
When new Antarctic scenarios are made, researchers will now have a more comprehensive 
understanding of Antarctic uncertainties. These will help guide the decisions made 
surrounding the future of the Antarctic. 
When creating future scenarios for Antarctica, the dashboard’s uncertainties can be explored 
for their many potential pathways and outcomes. Due to the conclusion that governance is the 
most crucial uncertainty for Antarctica’s future climate, this uncertainty should be 
investigated the most. Different pathways of the future of Antarctic governance and the ATS 
should be projected, allowing future scenarios to incorporate various outcomes, rather than 
limiting the flexibility of the scenarios by assuming Antarctic governance will develop in a 
single path. Furthermore, once Antarctic governance is explored for its potential outcomes, 
researchers should investigate how these different governance pathways will subsequently 
affect other socio-economic elements.  
This outlook can identify what may need to be altered or changed within the ATS to 




This dissertation has identified what sources of modelling uncertainties can be minimised.  
For future work, more time could be placed into developing modelling structures, placing 
more resources into creating a better understanding of the climate system and Antarctic 
climate feedback loops. This will minimise model uncertainty, and allow for more 
appropriate policy decisions to be made about Antarctica specifically.  
 
Analysing Antarctic uncertainties presented in this dashboard is a way of delving into 
imminent threats to Antarctica’s future. However, unless political action is taken as a 
response to the findings of this research, then climate change, and its subsequent negative 
affect on Antarctica, will continue. Futures studies explore potential pathways and outcomes 
for the globe or region, but these don’t necessarily lead to direct or mandatory policy 
changes. There is no correct approach to solve a wicked problem. Although using projections 
of potential future climate outcomes can clarify what the future may look like, it does not 
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Taking the green road 
Most sustainable path, greater management of global commons, 
leading to a greater collaboration of local and global institutions. 
Heath and education investments rise, with inequality lowered. 
Greater resource efficiency with a rise in technological 
advancements, reducing energy use. Renewable energy favoured 
with financial incentives, with consumption being focused around 
lower resource and energy intensity. Combinations of these factors 
return low challenges to mitigation and adaptation.  
SSP2: Middle of the road Global sustainability development is worked towards, but progress 
is slow. Environment degrades, however overall energy use is 
lowered. There is no preference for renewable energy. Social, 
economic and technological trends similar to the present. Global 
population grows moderately, then plateaus after approximately 
2050. There is no investment in fertility education in lower socio-
economic societies, creating an increasing inequality gap with a 
growth in population in low-income nations. Social cohesion is 
low, with social and environmental challenges prevalent. This SSP 
faces moderate challenges to mitigation and adaptation.  
SSP3: Regional rivalry—A 
rocky road 
Some strong regional environmental degradation, with low 
international investment in environmental issues. Domestic and 
regional issues are prioritised; with a low level of global 
cooperation. Barriers are introduced for trading, with a policy 
focus on national security. Investments in technology and 
education decline, with material consumption prominent. 
Inequalities, especially in lower socio-economic regions escalate. 
Poor progress towards sustainability with a decrease in 
environmental investment and an increase in inequality. 
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Developing countries exhibit high population growth, whilst 
developed countries populations are stable. Fossil fuel dependency 
is high, causing high challenges to mitigation and high 
challenges to adaptation. 
SSP4: Inequality—A road 
divided 
Global and regional inequlity is high. Society is split into ‘an 
internationally-connected society that is well educated and 
contributes to knowledge- and capital-intensive sectors of the 
global economy, and a fragmented collection of lower-income, 
poorly educated societies that work in a labour-intensive, low- tech 
economy’ (O’Neill et al., 2017, p. 173). Vulnerable groups have 
little democratic voice, with political power lying in the higher 
socio-economic sectors. There is high technological development 
within higher-tech economies and underinvestment in new 
resources in certain regions. Energy companies disperse their 
sources from traditional fossil fuel sources, to low-carbon 
alternatives. The environmental focus is on higher class local and 
regional issues. A combination of the application of some low-
carbon fuel sources, as well as there being a well functioning 
higher part of society forces low challenges to mitigation and 




Increased faith in competitive markets comes with the economic 
growth produced by industrialisation and the development of 
human capital. Global markets are integrated, with strong 
investments in health, and education. Economic and social 
development is fuelled by carbon resources, with overall rapid 
growth. Local environmental issues are addressed with 
technological advancements, however, there is little global effort to 
minimise emissions due to the tradeoff of a flourishing economy. 
High fossil fuel usage, coupled with a low concern for global 
emission rates lead to high challenges to mitigation and low 





Table 2 Categories and Elements copied from O’Neill et al. (2017) involved in climate change scenario making (Source: 
O’Neill et al. 2017, p.396) 
Category Elements for global climate change scenarios 
Demographics Population total and age structure 
Urban vs rural populations, and urban forms 
Other location information, such as coastal vs inland 
Economic 
development 
Global and regional GDP or trends in productivity 
Regional, national, and sub-national distribution of GDP, including 
economic catch-up by developing countries 
Sectoral structure of national economies, in particular the share of 
agriculture, and agricultural land productivity 
Share of population in extreme poverty 
Nature of international trade 
Welfare Human development 
Educational attainment 




Air, water, soil quality 
Ecosystem functioning 
Resources Fossil fuel resources and renewable energy potentials 
Other key resources, such as phosphates, freshwater, etc. 
Institutions and 
governance 
Existence, type and effectiveness of national/regional/global 
institutions 
Degree of participation 
Rule of law 
Technological 
development 
Type (e.g. slow, rapid, transformational) and direction (e.g. 




Diffusion of innovation in particular sectors (e.g. energy supply, 
distribution and demand, industry, transport, agriculture) 
Broader societal 
factors 
Attitudes to environment/sustainability/equity, and world views 
Lifestyles (including diets) 
Societal tension and conflict levels 
Policies Non-climate policies including development policies, technology 
policies, urban planning and transportation policies, energy 
security policies, and environmental policies to protect air, soil and 
water quality. It is possible that SSPs could be specified partly in 
terms of policy objectives, such as strong welfare-improving goals, 












Table 4 List of CMIP6 Models used to Project Surface Air Temperature for the Globe, Antarctic and Arctic 
Model Name Reference 
ACCESS-CM2 (Dix et al., 2019) 
ACCESS-ESM1-5 (Ziehn et al., 2019) 
BCCCSM2-MR (Wu et al., 2019) 
CanESM5 (Neil Cameron Swart et al., 2019) 
CESM2-WACCM (Danabasoglu, 2019) 
CNRM-CM6-1 (Voldoire, 2019) 
CNRM-ESM2-1 (Seferian, 2019) 
FGOALS-f3-L (YU, 2018) 
FGOALS-g3 (Li, 2019) 
GFDL-ESM4 (Horowitz et al., 2018) 
GISS-E2-1-G ((NASA/GISS), 2019) 
INM-CM4-8 (Volodin et al., 2019a) 
INM-CM5-0 (Volodin et al., 2019b) 
IPSL-CM6A-LR (Boucher et al., 2020) 
MCM-UA-1-0 (Stouffer, 2019) 
MIROC6 (Takemura, 2019) 
MPI-ESM1-2-LR (Brovkin et al., 2019) 
NorESM2-MM (Bentsen et al., 2019) 





Table 5 Dashboard of Socio-economic elements effecting the future of the Antarctic, and their associated uncertainties. 





Antarctic Protected Areas 
Each annexe of the Protocol was agreed upon by consultative parties at ATCMs before it could 
be signed and implemented. 
These protected spaces include; Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPA), Antarctic 
Specially Managed Areas (ASMAs), Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs), and Marine 
Protected Areas (MPAs). 
All-natural resources are protected within an MPA. It differs from the other three protected 
spaces as the area in which it occupies merely is marine. CCAMLR proposes MPAs, to then 
be analysed by CCAMLR’s Scientific Committee and Commission. MPA’s limit activities in 
the region and place strict guidelines regarding what interactions within MPA’s are allowed 
(CCAMLR, 2020a). 
Within ANNEX V of the Madrid Protocol, Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPA) and 
Antarctic Specially Managed Areas (ASMA) were drafted, to further outline what activities 
were inappropriate in specific areas on the continent. As technology advanced, and as time 
increased, the ANNEX’s were signed to allow the Antarctic Treaty to move with and 
developing changes in the world. As more previously inaccessible parts of Antarctica were 
opened to exploration (transportation and weather gear improving), legislation was required 
to outline dos and don’ts; upholding the Antarctic Treaty goals at preserving Antarctica for 
peace and science. Article 3 of ANNEX V states that ‘any area, including any marine area, 
may be designated as an ASPA to protect outstanding environmental, scientific, historic, 
aesthetic or wilderness values, any combination of those values, or ongoing or planned 
scientific research’ (ANNEX V: Area Protection and Management, 2002). ASPA’s are areas 
unable to visit unless the party has a designated permit. Article 4 of ANNEX V states that’ 
any area, including any marine area, where activities are being conducted or may in the future 
be conducted, may be designated as an ASMA to assist in the planning and coordination of 
activities, avoid possible conflicts, improve cooperation between Parties or minimise 
environmental impacts’ (ANNEX V: Area Protection and Management, 2002). ASMA’s are 
different from ASPA’s, where they impose a management plan. ASPA’s however, can be 
contained within ASMA’s, and therefore particular regions of ASMA’s also may be off-
limits without a permit. 
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Further, in ANNEX V, article 8 outlines historic sites and monuments. HSMs are sites 
recognised by states as ones that hold particular historical value and cannot be removed or 
damaged. All ASPAs, ASMAs and HSMs are proposed by a state or party, as they believe the 
site or area lies beneath the rules required for them to be protected or managed accordingly. 
These proposals are held before the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties at ATCMs. They are 




A delicacy in many countries; the Antarctic toothfish is a prized fish currently caught by 13 
licensed fisheries. Toothfish generally are caught using longlines but can also be fished using 
trawl and pot. Two species; Dissostichus Mawsoni and Dissostichus Eleginoides, are fished 
in the Antarctic waters. Dissostichus Eleginoides have catches between 10000-15000 tonnes 
per year, and their catch number has remained relatively constant for the past 20 years. 
Dissostichus Mawsoni began to be fished in 1998 and brings in catches between 
approximately 3000-5000 tonnes per year (CCAMLR, 2019).  
 
Icefish 
Icefish were heavily fished in the Southern Ocean during the 1970s and 1980s. This 
overfishing lead to decreased supply, resulting in the closure of Icefish fisheries in the 1990s. 
Since their closure, catches of Icefish have become small, to non-existent, with any catches in 
a year bringing in either no stock or less than 500 tonnes (CCAMLR, 2019).  
 
Krill 
Antarctic krill is caught by use of midwater trawls and beam trawls. Catch numbers of 
Antarctic Krill peaked to 400000-450000 tonnes per year during the late 1970s-early 1990s. 
This number decreased to approximately 10000 tonnes per year in the mid-1990s. Antarctic 
Krill catches have steadily increased to approximately 300000 tonnes in 2018 (CCAMLR, 
2019). 
Antarctic krill is a keystone species, as it is a significant part of many species diets; one 
towards the bottom of the food chain. For this reason, its fishery data must be monitored and 
regulated by CCAMLR not to overfish the species. ‘CCAMLR’s approach to managing the 
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krill fishery is to minimise the impact on the ecosystem rather than trying to maximise the 
size of the fishery’ (CCAMLR, 2019). Simulations are performed to estimate the krill 
population’s productivity and numbers, with an annual catch size of 620000 tonnes in the 
Southwest Atlantic. This number represents 1% of the overall krill size (unexploited) within 
this region (CCAMLR, 2019). 
Antarctic Whaling 
Whaling was banned by the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in Antarctica in 1986 
(ASOC, 2020). This ban set catch limits of zero across all whale species within the Antarctic. 
Before this ban, whaling significantly affected Antarctica’s wildlife, impacting all Southern 
Ocean whale species, with population numbers heavily depleted. The 1986 ban on whaling in 
the Antarctic was further advanced by introducing the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary 
(SOWS) in 1994, covering the summer feeding regions for 80-90% of the globes whales 
(ASOC, 2020). Japan continued to whale within the Southern Ocean under scientific research 
permits; however, this was later halted in 2014 due to Australia’s proposal to end all whaling 
in Antarctic waters, scientific and commercially (ASOC, 2020). 
There are multiple uncertainties within the socio-economic element of direct human impact 
and how this affects Antarctic wildlife. As a result of tourism, the impact that humans have 
directly on the wildlife is monitored by IAATO, but can also involve uncertainties depending 
on the situation; relying on individual tourists’ compliance and the cooperation of tourism 
staff. 
Accidental spills of oils or waste can impact surrounding wildlife from scientific research 
stations within the Antarctic. This uncertainty results from human error, or the inability to 
maintain research stations to be less harmful to surrounding ecosystems.  
The adverse effects of overfishing in Antarctic waters relies on monitoring by CCAMLR and 
intervention by ATS parties. Uncertainties of incorrect population estimates, due to illegal 
fishing and lack of information on a species, can increase these adverse effects, and result in 
the unsustainable fishing industry. 
 
The significant uncertainty underlying the adverse effects that human impact has on Antarctic 
wildlife is the success of the ATS. IAATO, CCAMLR and RCC’s are either organisations 
that are a subset of the ATS or were formed due to its signing.  
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Uncertainties surrounding the future of Antarctic governance would heavily impact future 
monitoring and regulation of direct human impact on the Antarctic wildlife and ecosystem. 
 
